















  Over the last decades a growing concern over the phenomenon of the underground economy 
has increased attention among officials, politicians, and economists. There are several important 
reasons why officials and the general public should be concerned in post-communist countries about 
the real size of the underground economy, as following: an impressive development of underground 
economy occurred after the collapse of former communist regimes and general liberalization of 
economic activity; under a growing underground economy, macroeconomics policy is based on 
mistaken official indicators (such as: income, consumption, unemployment, etc.). In such situation, an 
extended underground sector may cause severe difficulties to politicians, because it "provides” 
unreliable official indicators; an accelerated increase in the size of the underground economy, usually 
caused by a rise in the overall burden of taxes and regulations, may lead to an erosion of the tax base, a 
decrease in tax receipts and thus to a further rise of the budget deficit (in case of Eastern countries, 
these are perhaps accentuated due to a weak government bonds market and of a high inflation). First 
part of this study deals with a critical survey of main approaches of underground (informal) sector in 
specialized literature; second part focuses on models existing in literature, on their comparative 
estimating results of the size of underground economy and evaluation of fiscal policy effects. Also, 
some our results obtained by using specific models to investigate problems of underground economy in 
East European countries are presented. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Over the last two decades a growing concern over the phenomenon of the 
underground economy has increased attention among officials, politicians, and economists. 
For Romania, as for many other Eastern countries, there are several important reasons why 
officials and the general public should be concerned about the real size of the underground 
economy. Among the most important are the following: 
  1 - An impressive development of underground economy occurred after the collapse 
of former communist regimes and general liberalization of economic activity. This was 
favoured by the abolition of regulatory laws including ambiguous texts and the concrete way 
of translating them and of the quasi-comprehensive state own sector forms. But, an 
uncontrolled development of underground economy may lead to a slowness of the transition 
process itself. 
  2 - Under a growing underground economy, macroeconomics policy is based on 
mistaken official indicators (such as: income, consumption, unemployment, etc.). In such 
situation, an extended underground sector may cause severe difficulties to politicians, 
because it "provides” unreliable official indicators. 
  3 - An accelerated increase in the size of the underground economy, usually caused 
by a rise in the overall burden of taxes and regulations, may lead to an erosion of the tax 
base (the Laffer's curve principle), a decrease in tax receipts and thus to a further rise of the 
budget deficit. Moreover, in case of Eastern countries, these are accentuated because of a 
weak government bonds market and of a high inflation. 
  These growing concerns (among which the last two are also true for the Western 
countries) have led many authors to challenging tasks of measuring the size or growth rate of 
the underground economy, to trace back the main causes of it and to analyse the interactions 
of official and unofficial sectors of the economy. In this work we present the main opinions 
existing in literature regarding the underground economy approach. There are two divergent 
mainstreams: a first group of authors that consider unofficial or informal sector as being 
marginal and parasite, having insignificant role within the global economic system, its 
dynamics being unrelated to the changes of fiscal policy, and consequently it must be strong 
controlled and even repressed; the second mainstream, on the other hand, attributes to the 
unofficial sector an important compensatory role, its dynamics being strong related to the 
fiscal policy change. Generally, the partisans of first mainstream think direct and detailed 
methods (such as: periodic surveys, frequent controls of the potential tax payers by fiscal or 
other specialized organisms) as being adequate to estimate the size of each compose the 
underground economy and then to include in the next planned budget. Opposite to this 
viewpoint, the partisans of second mainstream consider that the main instrument to restrain 
underground sector is to operate changes in fiscal policy, which must be oriented toward 
stimulation of supply in free market conditions, and consequently to increase the allocation 
effects (these opinions are concentrated within the so-called supply-side economics). The 
first focused on regulation, control, and structure of income tax, but the second focused on 
budgetary policy and structure of covering governmental expenditure by sources. Our 
analysis shows that the mentioned divergence is often artificial, it occurring only when the 
ideological aspects prevail in disputes. In our opinion, the two mainstreams are more 
complementary. The two mainstreams are important for the transition period of Eastern 
economies, they being confronted with two simultaneous processes: de-regulation process 
relating to the former economic system and regulation process relating to the free market 
system. Regarding the methods used to estimate the size of underground economy in these 
countries, clearly indirect methods are more adequately at least for the present day period.  
This study has two parts: a first part which deals with main approaches of underground 
(informal) sector in specialized literature, its main components and methods used to estimate 
its size and dynamics (a distinct point represents the approach of underground sector in East 
European countries, its quick expansion during the transition period); the second part deals in 
detail with main classes of models existing in literature, presents their comparative estimating 
results of the size of underground economy and evaluation of fiscal policy effects, and some 
of our results regarding problems of underground economy modelling in East European 
countries. 
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PART ONE: CONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 
 
 
2. COMPONENTS OF UNDERGROUND ECONOMY  
 
  In this chapter, after a general presentation of the underground economy structure 
within national economy, we analyse its main components in case of each type of economic 
system. 
 
2.1 Architecture of Underground Economy 
 
  In a manner large, the underground economy covers very various activities: illegal 
(traffic, corruption, etc.) but as legal, that self is not counted by the national accountancy 
(domestic work, voluntary service, convivial activities or mutual aid of vicinity), or are not 
declared to social and fiscal administrations (fiscal fraud, clandestine work). In addition, the 
forms and dimension of the underground economy vary by economic system, legislation and 
others local particularities. 
  Function of criteria adopted for the approach, there are various forms of underground 
economy. The most frequently, the approach begins with the investigation of relationships 
between underground economy and national accountancy. In this context, taking account the 
character of reports with the State, often some authors oppose underground activities or 
generally the underground economy to the official economy (private and public). So, the 
underground exchanges therefore undertake in margin of controls of the State and under two 
distinct modes: the concealment (occult economy) and the autonomy (autonomous economy) 
(Rosanvallon, 1980). However, in framework of national accounts, the notion of production is 
heard as "the economic activity socially organized consisting in create goods and services 
exchanging on the market and/or obtained from productions changing on the market". Such 
definition of the production allows, at least from a theoretical viewpoint, the evaluation, within 
national accounts, of productive clandestine activities, but it excludes, by convention, the non-
merchant underground activities that are exerted in the domestic framework. Elsewhere, in 
the recent years the national accounts strive to take in consideration the underground 
economy, to leave from inquiries and rectification. The international definition (adopted 
notably by the European Community) of the underground economy understands two 
components: the fiscal fraud and the work to the black or "black economy". 
  The first reefers to the legal productive activities exerted by legally recorded units that 
make the object of declarations under - evaluated. The second understands the legal 
productive activities exerted by units non declared (stowaways) (these activities are designed 
as "economy to the black" by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Community) and 
also the illicit productive activities or "criminal economy" (production and trade of drugs, illicit 
trading, etc.). 
  There are some authors that have concentrated on the identification one by one of 
the components of the underground economy and on classification of motivations that they 
are underlying. Such taxonomy has their permits to evaluate the extent of the various 
activities, to discuss on causes and implications and to conclude, by unifying the particular 
estimations, on a global appreciation (Heertje and Barthelemy, 1984; Barthe, 1988; Pestieau, 
1989; Debare, 1992). This is the so-calls analytic method. 
  Contrary, other authors, on the rule those who are the partisans of the global or 
composite methods adopt an approach on an inverse way. They obtain, by aggregated 
methods and models, global estimations for the entire underground economy and then they 
seek explanations on the obtained results and to establish the place of various components 
within the underground economy.  This represents the so-called synthetic method. 
  We are interested equally in the both types of approach, but concerning the 
application of quantitative methods on the Eastern economies during the period of transition 
to a free market system, we are forced by objective reasons (mainly because of lack of data 
from samples and statistical surveys) to be more concentrated on indirect or global methods. 
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   The first approach considers a detailed structure by activities of the underground 
economy as following: 1 - penal activities that comprise transfers (flights, defrauds to 
insurance, scythe - currency, swindles, etc.), production and distribution of goods (drugs, 
pornography, etc.), production and distribution of services (whoremongering, illegal games, 
etc.) and crimes against people; 2 - fraudulent activities understanding fiscal fraud and work 
to the black (including the clandestine immigration); 3 - non-marketable activities 
understanding domestic work (cooking, housekeeping, gardening, serves of vicinity, etc.) and 
voluntary service or the convivial economy (to the associations or person benefit). 
  All classifications of this gender call immediately reserves (1). They are more 
empirical than systematic and do not avoid the crosschecking. For example, in the fraud, as 
in the work to the black, there are some penal aspects as also in the case of clandestine 
labour migrations.  Also, in other examples, income of an independent concealing only a part 
of its income or a wage earner not declaring income of a second job can be resumed in 
official statistics by usual rectification (clandestine labourer fee can be reflected in statistics by 
the form of expenses of the beneficiaries of their services). Other example, the refund 
undertaken by a companion of insurance to compensate a proprietor of a building to which it 
has voluntarily put the fire is taken in official statistics. There are also frequently transfers of 
activities from the marketable sphere to the non-marketable sphere. To fasten the domestic 
work and voluntary services to the underground economy generated many discussions 
among the economists. On the one hand, they resemble activities that would have to be 
added to the national production if one wanted to measure it correctly. On the other hand, in 
many cases, they are motivated reasonably consciously by an economic calculation in which 
the intention to escape all taxation and all regulation plays a considerable role. 
  Therefore, overlapping being numerous, there is convention to place each activity in 
an alone category taking into account the major motivation that is underlying the concerned 
activity (Pestieau, 1989). 
  Some that concerns the stallion to appreciate the relative importance of the 
underground economy we use more frequently in this work the GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product). Thus, excepting all debates reported till now, we consider the GDP recorded in 
official statistics as reflecting the activity in the visible sector of a national economy. To 
evaluate all activity unfolded during a year in a country, we consider a greater level of GDP 
(global or total GDP) including so the activity in the visible sector that the activity in the 
invisible sector of the underground economy. Making the difference between the two levels of 
the GDP can obtain a global estimation of the dimension of the invisible underground 
economy at macroeconomic level (the so-called invisible GDP). To obtain the dimension of 
the whole underground economy it is necessary to add the visible share of the underground 
economy, it is to tell that already recorded in national accounts (because of the discoveries 
realized by the fiscal authorities or by estimations coming from the extrapolations made with 
occasion of polls, inquiries, controls, etc.). The problem of what share of the underground 
economy is already enclosed in the national accounts will be approached in the next chapter. 
In Figure 2.1 we present a structural scheme of the national economy, including all activities, 
formal and underground, production of goods and services generating total GDP obtained 
during a year in a country (2). 
  According to several authors, the structure by components of the underground 
economy varies by category to which is affiliated a country or other. 
  In the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the underground economy presents some sameness, so some that concerns 
practice them "black" that in their motivations. Underground activity appears as parasitic in 
the industrialized countries of the West, regulatory of shortages in Eastern countries, and 
factor of development in Southern countries. 
  Until the collapse of the communist regimes, to leave from 1989, the Eastern 
countries had their "second economy", a particular parallel economy. Today, it seems to 
survive and adapt to under way economic mutations in Central and East European countries. 
Developing countries, in spite economic situations very heterogeneous, characterize by a 
large traditional sector that escapes the State. This "informal economy" constitutes in number 
of case the mode of dominant production and competes, otherwise to the development, the 
less to the surviving of population. 
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  Generally, one can assert that in Western countries there is a tendency to count and 
control underground activities, but in developing countries there is a tendency to tolerate 
them. In post-communist countries, at least until the present, there is an ambiguous attitude 
regarding the underground activity. 
  By many authors, the underground economy (including the domestic economy and 
voluntary service) represents only a fraction of the official economy in the case of Western 
countries, but it is sometimes greater than official activities in the case of developing 
countries. In the case of Eastern countries at least in present period there are no clear 
estimations at global level (3). 
  From current system of national accounts one can notice the exclusion by convention 
of underground activities non-marketable, those notably exerted in the domestic framework. 
This share of "forgotten accountancy" has consequences limited in industrialized countries 
and especially in Europe where the non-declared legal activities represent really the most 
important part of the underground economy. However, this is not the case in developing 
countries, where the self-consumption remains important and where the non-official 
production is often the most important part of the marketable economy. Probably, in Eastern 
countries there is an intermediate situation. 
  In the resentment that the problem to what basis it is necessary to bring the figures 
on a component or another of the underground economies remains opened, we present 
synthetically the estimations obtained by various authors relatively to the dimension of the 
underground economy and its components. 
 
2.2 Underground Economy in Industrialized Countries 
 
  In Western countries, a certain part of each component of underground economy, 
except for the fraudulent and criminal activities, there is already included in national accounts. 
After some authors, alone in Italy and USA it seems that it was enclosed a share of fraudulent 
and criminal activities in the official GDP (4). 
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 2.2.1 Non-Merchant Activities 
 
  The domestic work occupies a preponderant place not only among components of 
the underground economy, but also in the whole production of the society. On the other hand, 
the convivial activity is a growing component of the underground economy in Western 
countries. 
  After some authors, in the last decades, there is a transition of some productive 
sectors from the formal framework to a domestic framework that constitutes the most 
important transformation that has assigned the totality of the economy. Thus, Gershuny 
refuses to consider as base of economic development what he appoints the growth in unique 
sense - it is to tell the passage of the primary sector to the secondary, and of the secondary 
sector to the third sector. His position consists on the contrary in defend the idea of a swing 
between formal economies and informal economies - it is to tell marginal, domestic, and 
community (Gershuny, 1979). 
  In the same framework, we can place the central idea of the theory of Gary Becker, 
that asserts that the time is an economic resource whose optimal allocation between different 
usage, leisure, sleep, domestic activity, trip and profession, allows to household to reach its 
level maximal well-being (Becker, 1965). Other studies have insisted on the possibility of 
substitution between domestic work and merchant work (Gronau, 1973). In several countries, 
one has been able to verify the predictions of the model on empirical data. These predictions 
have generally been validated. Also one can go more far and to measure with a certain 
precision the effect that a modification in social or demographic variables can have on this 
offer of work (Pastieu, 1989).  In the next chapter we will insist on methodological aspects of 
the underground economy evaluation, but here we expose alone the results of estimations. 
  From numerous studies, the value of the domestic production is estimated generally 
in Western countries between 1/3 and 1/2 of the national product. In Annex 2.1 we present a 
table containing these estimations. One can observe an important variation according to the 
method used and to the year of reference. Generally convergent as absolute values in case 
of the same country, however the estimations on the dynamics must be considered with 
prudence. It is because, generally based on surveys and samples of households, in time 
occur many changes and influences of various factors, that is a weak structural stability in 
time. 
  Apart from numerous discussed on the role of the voluntary service within a modern 
society and on the structure of the population employed in this gender of activity, there is 
unanimity to consider a true explosion during the last years. Generally, it is considered 
traditionally a greater extension in USA than in Europe and greater in Nordic countries than in 
Mediterranean countries. Also, it is considered that the extension of voluntary service is 
greater to the richer population, also that there are some differences between countries 
concerning the structure of population participating in this type of activities by age, sex, 
occupation, education, religion, etc. To estimate the importance of the voluntary service at 
national level exist only some subjective estimations that seem to converge to a value of 
about 5% of the official national product. 
 
2.2.2 Merchant Activities 
 
  In their totality, the marketable underground activities or "black economy" represent 
about 15% of GDP. According to the method and to the country but there are great 
differences between estimations walking from 2% of GDP to more a quarter. Thus, Manasian 
has registered in 1987 those that were disposable for Europe. They vary evidently from a 
country to other, but also in case of the same country. In percentage of Gross National 
Product (GNP), "black economy" situates between 0.5% and 17.2% in Sweden, between 
3.8% and 12.7% in Belgium, between 2.4% and 16% in the United Kingdom, between 25% 
and 30% in Greece, and between 15.4% and 30% in Italy. 
 
2.2.2.1 Fiscal Fraud and Work to the Black 
 
  Fiscal fraud and work to the black go often peer; there are however cases when they 
go one without the other. A surreptitious worker can fulfil most of his fiscal obligations 
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 because of the fact that the taxes on income and social contributions are collected at the 
source. On the other hand, an independent who works on street and conceals to the fiscal 
authorities a part of his income cannot be qualified as labour to the black. There are some 
other differences between these two underground practices. The fiscal fraud covers a larger 
terrain since it does not concern solely income of the work. Motivations are different. The 
labour to the black seeks an income; if this income avoids the taxation will be better. The 
defrauder has an income that he wants to preserve in integrity. The labour to the black does 
not respect firstly social laws while the defrauder skirts the Code of the taxation. 
  Generally, it seems that the labour to the black is found mainly in weak income 
classes but the defrauder on average belongs to the richer classes. For social and 
professional categories, one finds defrauders in the groups of the independent workers or 
renters and in the liberal professions. Labourers to the black are mainly the inactive persons, 
the stowaway-immigrants, and the employees having a second occupation. 
  The main impact of the fiscal fraud is on the side of public receipt losses, but the work 
to the black is important for its impact on the labour market. The fiscal fraud idea gathers the 
totality of illegal practices that allow avoiding partly or totally the taxation. These practices are 
susceptible to penalties, perhaps penal. According to countries and periods, the social 
tolerance regarding the fiscal fraud varies, and with it, the frequency and severity of the 
controls. The fiscal fraud is not the alone manner to evade the taxation. There are many other 
efficient methods to evade the payment of fiscal duties, such as fiscal evasion and entire 
panoply of deductions, exemptions and credits on taxes that understands all fiscal system. 
Excepting the judicial aspect, the distinction between these techniques of non- payment of the 
taxes does not justify truly. The effects of fiscal evasion are analogous to that provoked by the 
fraud. It provokes less for the budget and inequity between taxpayers. In some cases, the 
public opinion is also against the one or the other of these methods of tax-payment 
avoidance. Thus some times, the public opinion has learnt that because of the technique to 
evade the fiscal duties, the rich politicians often avoid the payment of the entire amount of 
their fiscal duties. Moreover, aside of the fiscal evasion that exploits the gaps and 
contradictions of the fiscal regulations, there is other method of avoidance that feeds from the 
break in the profit of some taxpayers' categories. All time, the most powerful professional 
organizations use their influence on parliament to grant exemptions for their members (5). 
  One sees it on the channel from the legal to the fraud; there is no rupture but 
continuity. Between behaviours clearly legally and behaviours that are without ambiguity 
illegally, there is a zone curl. It is gradually that the taxpayer slips from the error to use fiscal 
option to the simple abstention and to the ability and the abuse of legal rights to the qualified 
fraud. 
  Concerning the evaluation of the fiscal fraud, the method the surest is considered that 
that leans on the fiscal administration data in matter of verifications. Then, these data are 
extrapolated to the totality of the taxable population and completed by punctual studies for 
income that escape from all verifications. This method is applied only in some countries, like 
in United States. In other countries, as in France, the periodic reports of designed organisms 
(Council of taxes in France) yield statistics on the verifications and fiscal outputs. In France, 
for example, for the former years the contribution of the controls to fiscal receipts represents 
approximately 5% of emissions of tax on the income and 8% of the product of the tax on the 
enterprises. This type of information does not teach us but anything on the actual importance 
of the fraud. From time to time, ministers of Finances, the Budget or the Justice give their 
clean evaluation but without quoting some the source or the method of calculation. Generally, 
figures that circulate are relatively low - approximately 3%. To the total, according to the 
INSEE, the economy "to the black" represents 4% of the GDP whose 3% for the fraud and 
fiscal evasion and 1% for the work to the black. 
  In revenge, non-official sources give greater estimations. According to Godefroy and 
Laffargue (1984), in 1979, the fraud represented 17% of the French fiscal receipts. According 
to Frank (1977), this figure was in Belgium of 18% for 1975. The rate of fraud varies 
according to the nature of the taxes. 
 
2.2.2.2 Delinquent Activities 
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   The crime is a violation of the penal law. So the content of the law, but that the 
manner how it is interpreted and applied may vary at one time and in the space. To lean on 
the criminal phenomenon to surround some economic impacts is without null doubting a 
delicate and common bit. By Kellens, "the data on the cost of the crime are not purely and 
simply transposable in terms of profit: the cost is not the simple reverse of the profit" (Kellens, 
1987). Pestieau (1989), after an analysis of this phenomenon, distinguishes three categories 
of criminality, that those destroy the human or physical resources, that that produces goods 
and services and finally that that constitutes a simple transfer. In the national accountancy 
viewpoint the first category would correspond a subtraction, the second - an addition and the 
third would have a neutral effect. 
  Certain prudence is required nevertheless in the manner to post the criminal 
productions, a similar prudence that in the case when the national accountancy ignores the 
degradation of the environment that keep up some productive activities. Also, there is little 
estimation from an economic viewpoint of the properly criminal activities. 
  We are interesting more in economic crime in a broad sense because it can be better 
evaluated that the criminality whose motivation is not before all economic and whose impact 
is not directly economic (rape, political assassination, etc.). In a such study that present an 
monetary estimation for USA, besides the fiscal fraud that includes the work to the black and 
the clandestine immigration, the authors distinguish two great categories: illegal transfers of 
goods and services (flight, swindling, corruption, fraud) and the illegal production and 
distribution of goods and services (drugs, whoremongering, usury) (Simon and Witte, 1981). 
To the total, it gives, for the year 1974, some of more of 12% for the entire illegal activities, 
from which about a half for what is not fiscal fraud and work to the black. It is a specific 
feature of USA by report with many other countries. The properly criminal activities occupy 
there an important place. Unfortunately, it does not exist evaluations more recently. By some 
appreciation, it would seem that the trade of drugs, mainly that cocaine, has strongly 
increased since. The fiscal American administration gives for 1981 the figure of 23 thousand 
million dollars (IRS, 1983) comparing with fifteen billions as evaluation for 1974. Estimations 
more recent go until more hundred thousand million dollars. 
  In revenge, in a study provided by the Center of Sociological Studies, the criminal 
activities in France have been evaluated in 1982 to the total as some of 4.1% of the GDP 
(2.4% fiscal fraud and 1.7% activities properly criminal). In this study it has been evaluated 
also the cost of the control of the criminal phenomenon. To the total it (including repression, 
prevention and protection) represents approximately 1.2% of the GDP (Godefroy and 
Laffarque, 1984). 
  In a global estimate for West - European countries the properly criminal activities are 
appreciated to approximately 2% of the official national product (Pastieu, 1989). 
  In the last decade, some authors consider that there is a diversification as well as an 
internationalisation of underground activities. Among new developing forms of underground 
economy are considered: extension of speculative activities on the financial markets and 
especially on financial bourses; internationalisation of the networks of production, transport, 
and distribution of drugs; occurrence of new zones from the so-called category "fiscal 
paradise"; extension of illicit international trade and the so-called "organized crime". For 
instance, during the period 1980 - 1990 the difference between the international exports and 
imports increased from 20 thousand million dollars to about 100 thousand million dollars. In 
these conditions more international organizations become high interested in research of the 
"hidden face of the world economy" (Debare, 1992). 
 
2.3 Underground Economy in Developing Countries 
 
  The general situation of developing countries is very heterogeneous. However, these 
countries are characterized often by the subsistence of a large traditional sector whose State 
is absent. In these countries, non-official economy constitutes generally the mode of 
dominant production, and determines for part the level of development. This situation explains 
that under - developed economies are sometimes qualified as "duality". 
 
2.3.1 Components of the informal sector 
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   The importance of the informal or non structured sector, notion created by 
international institutions - World Bank, International Labour Bureau (BIT)  - to the beginning of 
the years 1970s, in developing countries can be partially and paradoxically explained by the 
strong intervention of the State in number of these economies. Even if an evolution to a very 
fort economic liberalization is made day, States of the third-world are long attached to 
stimulate the development, notably by plans and the implantation of industries that they 
expected to be "industrial-incentive". This state interventionism did not integrate the traditional 
modes of activity. This idea of the development condemned some leaves the traditional 
activities; non-to vanish, but to become informal. 
  Forts of this distinction between an official economy planned by the State and an 
informal sector gathering the activities which escape from all controls, some observers assert 
that the informal sector allows alone the surviving and even the development of these 
societies (BIT, 1972; Adair, 1985, 1995; Lautier, 1994; Cherif and Nafii, 1995, etc.). 
  One distinguishes traditionally in developing countries two fundamental forms of the 
informal economy. Such there is a "primitive" form that covers mainly the agricultural auto-
production and the auto-equipment of rural zones. It concerns the activities that undertake in 
the proximate continuation the domestic work, the frontier being well difficult to trace. The 
other part of this informal sector gathers the merchant activities, those that make the object of 
change. It concerns artisan or commercial activities and services, generally at small scale. 
They are multiplied with the rural exodus and the demographic explosion that provokes the 
increase of cities and urban outlying districts. The proliferation of these activities undertakes 
in margin of all legal obligations and escapes from the state regulation. However, the local 
public authorities tolerated them, because they allow attenuating social tensions by absorbing 
a part of the underemployment and by diminishing some shortages. 
  To illustrate this heterogeneity, one can examine the degree of marketization of a 
country. In an economy of barter, goods are generally changed against goods with the losses 
well known of a system: it limits the number of transactions; it breaks a rational allocation of 
resources; it makes necessary an ineffective risky stocking of goods; finally, it breaks the 
specialization and the division of the work. By some gross evaluations, in the years 1970s in 
some developing countries, especially African countries, the fraction of non-monetary 
economy within the national economy is very important: 49% in Rwanda, 45% in Ethiopia, 
42% in Niger, 39% in Malawi, 38% in Burkina Faso, 33% in Mali, 28% in Tanzania, 20% in 
India and in Malaysia, 13% in Dominican Republic, etc. (Chandavarkar, 1985). 
  The analysis of the non-structured sector has taken its genuine flight due to the 
launching of the BIT's world program on the labour. Seven criteria there were considered to 
define the informal sector. They concern all directly or indirectly the job. They are: 1 - The 
facility to entry that means that each person can provide its basis needs by exerting this type 
of activity (6); 2 - The utilization of local resources: economy of proximity, job of family 
assistance and auto-financing; 3 - The family property of enterprises; 4 - The small scale of 
enterprises: number of their staffs are less than 10, according to the statement of Sethuraman 
(1976); 5 - A labour-intensive technology adapted to the local conditions; 6 - Of acquired 
training outside of the scholastic system; 7 - Of the markets of competition non-regulated to 
the relative disposition look to the salary, to the security, to the conditions of work, etc. 
(Lubell, 1991). 
  Other authors propose different criteria, as: absence of institutional credits, a 
production destined to the final consumer, absence of fix work schedules, etc. (Sethuraman, 
1976). On the look methodological, the informal sector be characterize by escape to empirical 
investigation ways: producers working without permanent job, exemption of the licence or 
import payment, exclude the social regulations, having no accountancy or by sources of 
income, on the one hand formal - salaries and various allocations - and, on the other hand 
informal, according to the criterion of the salary and the auto - job (Hart, 1973). However, the 
informal job regroups generally family jobs in the artisan sector and the small profession as 
well as the occasional or temporary activities within the modern sector (construction of the 
buildings, daily of stocks, wheel of work hand, etc.). The informal sector also distinguishes by 
a judicial and social organization different from that in formal sector. Thus, Mazumdar (1976) 
defined a labour market non-protected without the system of social securities or a market of 
competitive products and non-regulated that delimit the field of the non-structured activities. 
Several other works taking some counts the heterogeneity of the informal sector, distinguish a 
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 modern traditional sector (Nihan, 1980), or subdivide the non-structured sector in two sub-
sectors (Steel and Yasuoki, 1978; Steel, 1980). The first sub-sector, unregulated or residual, 
encloses a large menu of legal activities - marginal (gardening, washing of cars, begging, 
etc.) and small prestige - and number of illegal activities; the second sub-sector, regular or 
intermediary (7), understands the economic activities at small scale by family enterprises and 
generally non-salaried. 
 
2.3.2 Economic Policy and Informal Sector 
 
  In developing countries, can be probably stronger than in the other countries two 
opposite theses, concerning effects that the informal sector induces, the decisions of 
economic policy that it calls, are put in discussion. For some, losses registered by the State 
are considerable, the lack to earn are recorded at all levels. The informal economy would 
carry wrong on the totality of an national economy, such as: the non perception by the rights 
and tax State being able to reach several billions, the loss registered on the stage of the 
marketing (indirect taxes) and the diminution of the stocks of strong currencies. The national 
accountancy tends to under evaluate the GDP and the national wealth by inhabitant. The 
contraband has internationalised, and there exists of parallel circuits having important 
financial resources and ways of communication, fraud and modern and sophisticated 
transportation that endanger the security of the State. In this context, the objective no longer 
is to maximize indirect or direct fiscal receipts. It is doubled by an objective concerning the 
security of the "gendarme" State or "providence" State. 
  For the partisans of the second more liberal mainstream, the informal economy 
represents a spontaneous response to the incapacity of the State to satisfy aspirations of the 
poorest people. In now a legal device a lot too constrains, if one believes some the Laffer 
curve, it corners agents to operate in margin of the law. By escaping such system, agents of 
the informal economy would be far more productive that the State. Thus, in these conditions, 
the crisis and the recessions seem to be only a statistical illusion? More again, the economic 
policies are not they led to failure, since the majority of the activities and agents escape 
completely from the public decisions? Moreover, these all are not integrated by the 
economists in their plan, and whose main virtue is to profit the totality of the population, 
farmers, carriers, traders, etc. Today, some authors from developing countries consider that 
the developed countries tent to formalize the informal economy and restrain the field of action 
of the informal activities, with often of perverse effects such that the development of the 
exclusion. To the reverse, in some developing countries the informal economy is often 
considered as being a main factor of development, it is the case notably of economies of 
Maghreb (Cherif and Nafii, 1995). 
  Some of such problems are current also for the post-communist economies of the 
Central and East-Europe so that others of them are specifically. 
  As an order of magnitude of this informal economy in developing countries, by some 
estimations, it represented in 1980: 40% of the GDP and half of the active population in Peru; 
46% of the active population in Brazil, 40% in Mexico, 29% in Chile, 26% in Argentina, etc. 
Estimations more recently, for countries of Maghreb that have adopted of policies sustaining 
the informal sector, give: 50% of the GDP and 57% of the active population in Morocco, 36% 
and respectively 26% of the active population in Tunisia and respectively in Algeria 
(Charmes, 1990). 
 
2.4 Underground Economy in East European Countries 
 
  Before even to undertake the reforms destined to establish market economy, Eastern 
country had their private sector: the underground economy. Until the collapse, to leave from 
1989, the communist regimes and their planned economies, these countries knew a parallel 
economy, fundamentally illegal, but that had everywhere straight to existence. Here we can 
mention Grossman (a pioneer concerning the study of underground economy within socialist 
countries) who qualifies it as "second economy". The upheavals intervened in Europe at the 
end of the 1980s do not threaten this "second economy". Null doubts that it will know to adapt 
to economic mutations under way at Warsaw, Prague or Bucharest. But "shadow economy" 
will lose without doubt its specificity. 
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   The socialist economies of Eastern Europe, including Romania, were also qualified 
as "economies of shortage" (Kornai, 1980), the production and services being always smaller 
than demand. During the 1980s, the disparity between increased waits and the system's 
deficient performance emphasized (8). 
  In official economy, the systems of cooperation and the networks of supply degraded, 
causing the stops of work that one sought to avoid, to the exterior by informal exchange with 
other enterprises, to the interior by the substitution of supply sources and by the 
improvisation. A growing share of the production as well as of the time of work was turned 
aside to the households and their social networks, because it was in the distribution of 
consumption goods that the shortage was made feel the most vigorously to see it the 
abundance in West - European countries that demonstrates "to doors". More, the households 
produced and exchanged themselves a goods and services share that made absence. The 
transition from countries of Europe Central and Oriental to the political pluralism and market 
economy favours the temporary development of new underground activities, due to the fact 
notably of the disorganization of traditional distribution circuits. Economic mutations will limit 
without doubt some forms of parallel activities specifically to countries of planned economy 
(9). The disappearance of term of "shortage economy" would have to render void number 
networks, circuits and illegal markets whose one can paradoxically underline the role in the 
apprenticeship of market economy. It remains that the ex - socialist countries would not have 
to see disappear underground economy and that they seem to registered, due to the favour of 
the disorganization of the ancient system and the too slow installation of the free market, a 
development worrying of the Mafioso activity. 
  Under the former communist regimes the underground economy development had 
some particularities. That is why firstly we expose briefly these particularities and then we 
analyse the present problems of underground economy development during the transition 
period. 
 
 2.4.1 Underground Economy in Communist Planned Economies 
 
  Before 1989, the omnipresent State and the scarcity of goods carried a particular 
underground economy, product of the planning and its associated shortage, factor and of the 
depersonalising of the property due to the collectivisation. This "second economy", by 
opposition with the official system of planned economy, covers "all what relieves of the 
research of private gain, more all what is in fine with the law" (Grossman, 1977; Duchêne, 
1981). 
  This heterogeneous system of prosperous but illegal activities is often tolerated under 
the shade of planned economy. The degree of repression depends of the appreciation of 
public authorities and especially of the economic situation, to the extent in which practice 
them underground play often a role of regulation of shortage. The repression depends often 
of the degree of corruption of the responsible premises, and the visibility more or less great of 
underground economy.  Many repressed activities by the law, at least from a theoretic 
viewpoint, benefit of the social consent.  For as much, the tolerance of the State has limits, 
that Pestieau underlines when he evokes condemnations for "economic crimes" in the ex - 
USSR: about a million per year, what gives elsewhere an idea of the generality of this gender 
of practices. 
  This second economy feeds transfers of productive factors from the planned sector to 
the non-official sector: work and goods are turned aside. The disguised unemployment, 
characteristic for Eastern countries, and the "work double" - the official time of work may be 
shortened to allow an external activity, it can also may be put in profit to undertake instead of 
the official production a clandestine production - provide its labour to the second economy. To 
the activity exercised in an enterprise of State or a cooperative is added or combined often a 
work of the shade. In the same manner, products are frequently "deducted" on stocks of the 
State enterprises. Underground economy was developed therefore as parasitic of official 
economy. It brings however the responses to defaults and rigidities of planned economy and 
notably to the shortages, to the standardization, to the bad quality of products or to the 
problems of supply of cities. 
  In a general approach, one can consider that the informal activities of the households 
cover four distinct forms: the self-production of goods and services consummated by the 
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 households themselves; the production for and exchange within the social networks; the work 
to the black and exchange of materials on the black market; semi - formal economy, in the 
framework of which official institutions buy informal products or remunerate of "volunteers" 
works. In the same time, in the enterprises, there were three forms of informal work: the 
diversion of stocks, the diversion of equipment, and the diversion of time of work. 
  If second economy is globally destined to produce goods that will be self-
consummated or changed on the parallel market, the underground activities in planned 
economies know forms also various that in industrialized countries. To aside of official 
economy official there were constituted "private - family" and "informal" economies. These 
clandestine economic activities carry essentially on the production and exchange of rare 
goods or rationed (gasoline, meat, vodka, etc.), and on services of all sort (repairing, medical 
benefits, works of construction, transportation, etc.), other activities are very diffused: flight for 
domestic purposes), exchange of services, trades, and work to the black. Pestieau 
distinguishes between illegal private economy (clandestine private enterprises, black market), 
legal private economy (notably in the agricultural sector, where some patches give place to a 
private activity far more productive that in the State cooperatives and farms), and public illegal 
economy (deduction of produced goods or those destined to the State enterprises, diversion 
of the official work time to the private purposes). 
  In enterprises, the material was turn aside. This was not only of the various pieces of 
replacement that made always absence, and that all the enterprises stock great quantities, 
because all the sector was under - developed. It was of the quantities more or less great of 
the production or current distribution - especially those that survive only periodically: 
exceptional or rare foods, the clothes product exclusively for the export to the West, from 
woods or the taps or costs of stones utilized for the small buildings constructed often without 
permission, cure or place prescriptions of holidays, etc. One used in an informal manner the 
workroom and services of enterprise, is for the repairs, is for transportation in cars of service. 
  The time of work was turn aside, been to accomplish orders "under the table" in the 
enterprise, is to make commissions outside (often to the service of the entire collective of 
work). Friday in the afternoon (or in Romania, Saturday in the afternoon), the supplementary 
or "volunteer" work, night shifts were the preferred times of informal activities in the 
enterprises. Nevertheless, the former were currently practiced only in some branches and in 
some situations of job; heavy industry, personal and social services, the administration of 
routine were propitious bit, as well as the work at piece or to the little window for public 
services. Some enterprises searched for to channel these activities by offering contingents of 
their products or second hand pieces of change. Most propose elsewhere of the materials 
and works "out statement" to their employees or their retreats; the field of the informal 
activities becomes blurred (10). 
  Generally, the self-production of the households had a best reputation and was 
encouraged by the State. Most important areas concern the construction and the 
maintenance of the accommodation, the gardening, the mutual aid, etc. (11). The social and 
charitable commitment was almost exclusively feminine: it profits especially to relatives and to 
close friends. There was also a remarkable voluntary assistance to poor children or to the 
handicapped persons, the activities of protection of the nature, etc. The State sought to 
encourage and to channel these activities in the framework of official organizations. The 
qualified force of work was often associated within a particular professional association: the 
great repairs, the more refined wardrobes, the judicial advice was found more easily and at a 
smaller cost in the social networks (12). 
  The economic importance of these activities is very difficult to be evaluated. The 
research in Poland or in Hungary line of the increasing role of the domestic work, estimated a 
value of about 1/4 of the GDP, and for the informal work estimated a value of 1/10 of the 
GDP; both have known an expansion in the course of the 1980s (Sik, 1994). 
  Apart from the household, there was a narrow circle of relatives and close friends that 
benefited first by the informal work. It concerns less a logic of the utility or maximizing of the 
"social capital", than motives of moral obligation and social commitment that prevailed in the 
distribution of informal productions in the "narrow circles" in East-European economies (13). 
  Parallel economy of planned economies covers also hatches a bond informal, the 
networks, circuits and markets parallel. The markets that organize to palliate defaults of the 
system and notably the absence of plug in account by the population demand plan. Contrarily 
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 to the planned economy, the underground economy is oriented by this demand. It tenders to 
satisfy it is by local productions, is in restoring a certain international product circulation. 
Eastern countries, indeed, were struck by restrictions on imports, and the non - convertibility 
of their currencies. Finally, the logic of second economy is merchant, and it is the 
confrontation on the black market between the offer and demand that allow the fixing of 
prices. 
  If the totality of Eastern economies was characterized by state control, the extreme 
centralization and the authoritative mobilization of the material and human resources for the 
realization of plans, there were, despite the alignment on the Soviet "model", some 
differences from a socialist country to another. The differences could affect importantly on 
forms and conditions of exercise of the underground activities. Romania during the 
Ceaucescu's regime has known, in the 1980s, a terrible hardening of the repression against 
underground economy - some explain even the destruction of villages and the roundup of the 
population in collective real estate by the will to diminish the possibilities of embezzlement of 
the agricultural production. But this repression has not been able to come to end from 
informal practices and mechanisms rendered inevitably by the width of the shortages. In 
Hungary, second economy was on the contrary limited by measures enlarging the field of 
recognized action for the small private enterprise. In Poland, public enterprises themselves 
participated in the "second circulation" and in the development of underground economy by 
organizing distribution of missing goods. 
 
2.4.2 Underground Economy in Transition Period 
 
  In a short period, Central and East-European countries has undergone deep 
transformations that may be conceived on three plans: the marketization of economy and 
development of the private sector, the machine of State on which institutions and the national 
regulations were grafted, the economic framework and institutional of the daily life. 
  From the viewpoint of the informal sector, some of more important transformations 
were the abrupt extension of market economy and especially the marketization of the supply 
of the households. Previously, these were sustained for an important share by subsidies to 
products and services of basis; number of cultural and social services was almost 
"gratuitous". More of a total income quarter of the households had consisted in "indirect 
income". Today, this is monetary income of the households that determined largely the 
standard of living. Public assistance is made to complain as individual rights. Since 
transformations of the regimes, a relative product abundance and private services supplied 
mainly by Western assistance, by the foreign enterprises and an opening of goods imports of 
consumption subsidized has submerged a national market once deficient. On rule, during the 
first year, after the changes of communist regimes, the households consume some largely. 
Industry of consumption goods that in same time had lost Oriental markets, as well as 
Western market (by elimination of the some ancient facilities of subsidy), undergoes a second 
hard knock. A great number of gratuitous social services, almost many of the consumption 
subsidies, and a share of assistance with families were demolished since, that drugged a 
rapid rise of prices of basis consumption, fares and rents. 
  But income records a rise slower than the productivity, because unions and the State 
were forced to maintain a switchboard of life higher than the past. Effects of these 
modifications were distributed unequally, originated the two appearance categories: the 
"winners" and the "losers". Also, the other continuations from transition to an economy of 
market in the East having impacts on the underground economy were unemployment, 
elimination of restrictions on labour market and on the time of the people, passage to a more 
liberal legislation concerning the withdrawal from legal job and multiple-job, a lot of 
successive transformations of fiscal laws and the inefficiency of activities destined to controls 
and penalty on the non-declared income. 
  There are two hypotheses concerning the social transformation and the impact on 
underground economy that would seem plausible. The first is that of social polarization. Odds 
of job diversifying socially, and the standard of living depending almost entirely of the situation 
of job, there will be a polarization between, on the one hand, the households with several jobs 
that have thus an informal potential more important (in terms of property, opportunities, social 
relationships, etc.) and, on the other hand, the households partially or wholly in 
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 underemployment that, by lack of ways, realize less of informal activities (Pahl, 1988). The 
second hypothesis is the marketization of social relationships. The standard of living 
depending largely of their monetary resources and social rights, the active persons see 
exposed to fluctuations of the labour market, but the non - active persons depend of their 
individual capacity to impose their rights in a system of justification. The development of 
monetary economy tenders to render anonymous and to make objective social relationships: 
institutional relationships will be depersonalised; among personal relationships, those that are 
oriented to material purposes will be diminished, relationships in the "large circles" will be 
made objective, the "narrow circles" covering exclusively an affective character. At present, 
there are many debates on the availability of one or other hypothesis (Neff, 1995). Surely, 
today, some of objective conditions of the economy of shortage have disappeared. On the 
other hand, the deepen liberalization of the social and economic life as rapid legislative 
transformations, sometimes non - correlated and sometimes non-coherently, have opened, at 
least during the present period of transition and in same time of crisis, a large manifestation 
field for the underground activities exerted by a population that was forced to practice them 
several years during the former communist regimes but in conditions incomparably harder. 
  In enterprises, it is expected that in some years the informal work will diminish to a 
comparable level to that usual in Western economies. But, in countries where the process of 
privatisation advances too slowly or where the intervention of the State in economy continues 
to be great this is not place. On the other hand, an atmosphere of distrust and competition 
seems to forbid the informal activities. In the public life, in revenge, trends of sociability, factor 
determinant of the informal work for the social networks, diversify. 
  A minority, rather youths and these of average age, uses fully the new possibilities of 
expression and free organization and the opportunities of consumption. The oldest, the 
persons without job and those having low income have tendency to pull in a narrow circle of 
relatives and ancient. This has contributed to diminish social relationships "large", which 
characterized the former socialist society. In the closed circle of relatives and friends, 
contacts have become non-frequently, but in the same time more intense than previously 
(Neff, 1995). 
  Since 1989, by some authors, at least in the case of Eastern Germany, exchanges 
between colleagues and contacts of leisure were diminished strongly, the debates and 
consultations within family and between friends increased, the mutual aid diversified 
(diminution in case of active persons and increase in case of non-employees). 
  Also, since 1989, the households have reduced essentially works of sewing as well 
as the production and the repairing of utensils; fewer forts being the diminution of works 
destined to conserving of food and repairing of car (the electronic pieces in the new cars 
constricting the repairing). The increased offer on the market is designed as essential cause. 
Also, on the pressure of the marketization of economy, it seems that many of the ancient 
domestic activities diminished. 
  Concerning the estimation of underground economy size in Eastern countries, after 
1989, the literature is too spare. Although there was some preoccupation (14), the 
estimations remain most divergent, various figures being emitted by different institutions 





(1) There are many other criteria and possibilities to present the structure of underground 
economy. In this subject, we recommend without the works already mentioned those of 
INSEE (1976), Gershuny (1979), Blades (1982), Feige (1982), Archambault and Greffe 
(1984), Gaudin and Schiray (1984), Greffe (1984), Porter and Bayer (1984), Adair (1985). 
(2) The structure of national economy presented in Figure 2.1 is based on that proposed by 
Smith (1986). 
(3) This situation explains especially by lacking data relative to the dimension of the 
underground economy during the communist regimes and, on the other hand, by multiples 
reform during the recent transition period so of the statistical data system and national 
accountancy that the legislation. 
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 (4) According to Blades, who has questioned the statistical institutes of all countries of the 
OECD, it seems that Italy and United States are the alone two countries where illegal goods 
and services record in national accounts. In Italy, one mentions cigarettes of contraband. In 
the United States, one estimate a share about 10% of all production of illegal goods how 
appears in declarations of income under the particular rubric "other income" (Blades, 1982). 
(5) See, in this matter, the book of Bennett and Dilorenzo (1984), that treats in large the 
practice, by various methods, of tax-payment avoidance in case of public enterprises. 
(6) This criterion is a cause that the non-structured sector is considered as a main factor of 
the absorption of rural exodus (Charmes, 1987). 
(7) Contrary to modern sector using intensively fixed capital that represents an obstacle to 
admittance of individual entrepreneurs, the intermediate sector disposes of small quantity of 
fixed capital, criterion being in this case a positive marginal productivity (Steel and Yasuoki, 
1978). 
(8) In literature, there are many studies on this subject. Here we mention only some of that 
realized after 1989 within The Leuven Institute for Central and East European Studies or the 
Ace-Phare programs (Linotte, 1992; Jackson, 1995). Also, in Romania's case we mention 
only some studies on this subject (Ionete, 1994; Albu and Ungureanu, 1994; Albu, 1995). 
(9) To understand better this subject, it is useful that we remember some conclusions from 
some comparative studies (Grossman, 1977; Katsenelinboigen, 1977; Kornai, 1980; Simis, 
1982; Dallago, 1987). So, besides the legal "regular" economy an illegal "irregular" or 
"underground" economy exists in all capitalist regulated market economies. Such an 
underground economy existed even in the Eastern countries during the former communist 
regimes. In certain respects underground economy was similar in Eastern countries and 
Western countries. For instance, in both systems underground enterprises tend to specialize 
in labour-intensive activities without significant economies of scales. Also, enterprises in 
underground sector may get inputs from, or supply outputs to, firms in the official or visible 
sector. In both systems, by omitting underground activity, official statistics understate 
employment, production, consumption, and other macroeconomic indicators. But in the same 
time there were many differences between the two economic systems. So, whereas the main 
reason for underground activity in Western economies is evasion of taxes and government 
regulations, in Eastern economies the chief reason was to produce goods and services in 
shortage at official prices set below market-clearing levels. Thus, in the first case customers 
usually pay lower prices for underground goods and services than for the output of regular 
firms, whereas in the second case they pay higher prices for underground products than for 
the visible output. Also, with open unemployment common in Western countries but not in the 
former central planned economies, underground work in the first case often is a person's 
primary job, while in the second it usually was supplementary to regular employment. In 
former Eastern socialist economic system there were two major components that together 
form the so-called underground entrepreneurial sector: underground private enterprises and 
underground private activities (Grossman, 1977; Katsenelinboigen, 1977; Simis, 1982). The 
first was real enterprises run by private owners and entrepreneurs; these enterprises hire 
workers to gain profit. They were underground because law prohibited this type of enterprise 
or because an underground existence was more profitable. Underground private enterprises 
generally supplied consumption goods and personal services because of their simpler and 
less risky marketability. Less frequent was the case of the supply of production goods and 
services, including to socialist enterprises. The vast range of production items included 
garments, footwear, household articles, houses, home brew alcohol, and various services 
(car and home repair, sewing and tailoring of garments, transportation of persons and goods, 
and the like). Underground private activities, on the other hand, reach large dimensions and 
are not independent, but are in symbiosis with a socialist enterprise. The latter unofficially 
produced goods and services, using inputs paid for by private persons, owners of the 
products and services supplied. Another case of this symbiosis between visible and invisible 
activities was typified by socialist enterprises managed and run as virtually private 
enterprises. Here, production taken place according to the plan but yields a higher quantity. 
The surplus remained underground and was sold on the irregular market; and organizers of 
the underground activity took the revenue. Evidently without widespread corruption, this type 
of mechanism could not function. Activities are said to be underground because they break 
the law, escape regulation, or transgress social agreements. They either are prohibited (such 
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 as private enterprises in certain sectors of central planned-type economies) or are performed 
underground to circumvent prohibitions, limitations, and controls. The existence of these 
activities is explained by the institutional structure of the economic system. In communist 
system, underground activities were all pervasive. They seem to be prosperous mainly 
because there was a wide demand for goods and services not satisfied by the official 
economy, and because underground activities grant the organizers considerable rewards. 
The institutional organization of the economy causes shortage in the regular economy, 
thereby fostering demand for goods and services supplied by underground activities (Kornai, 
1980). There existed three major groups of goods. The first consisted of goods and services 
used by enterprises. When enterprises had no inner constraints against input increases (as in 
the former socialist-type system), only an administrative policy was effective. In such 
circumstances, input shortage was unavoidable, creating ample room for irregular activity. 
However, owing to technological factors, and control and repression activity, the underground 
economy was confined mostly to irregular exchange of production goods and services among 
socialist enterprises and much less to underground production. A second group is made up of 
consumption goods and services used by families and the private sector of the economy. 
Both consumers and private sector have hard inner constraints against demand increases. 
Underground activity permits an increase in both income and consumption. This group of 
goods constitutes the main area of underground production; controls are difficult, and 
production technology is often simple. The third group is made up from goods and services 
used by enterprises, on the one hand, and families and private sector, on the other hand. This 
is a very wide category and the most difficult to control through economic policy. In fact, there 
is an imbalance between socialist enterprises and families, since only the latter have an inner 
constraint against demand increases. For this reason, economic policy produces a 
displacement effect to the disadvantage of families. Utilization of policy instruments to limit 
demand will be effective on the consumers' side but will have little effect on discouraging 
enterprise demand. The consequence for aggregate demand may be negligible (Dallago, 
1987). 
(10) See, for more details, Neef (1995). 
(11) In mentioned study, about the informal economy in East Germany, Neff affirms that 1/5 of 
urban households and 1/2 of rural households live in individual buildings that were 
constructed mainly by personal work. 
(12) This except for Romania, where the communist regime of Ceaucescu would forbid the 
most of civil associations and organizations. 
(13) Regarding the analysis of social networks in the communist regime, a large list of authors 
there is in a recent study of Neef (1995). 
(14) In case of Romania, it can be mentioned the Workshop on "Parallel Economy", 
organized within the National Institute of Economic Research under the coordination of 
Academician Emilian Dobrescu, among 1992-1993. 
(15) Till the present, for Romania there is only some global appreciation about the size of 
underground economy. So, the President of the National Commission for Statistics showed 
that, based on national accounts, the underground economy in Romania represented 9-10% 
of GDP in 1993. Also, by the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, the size of 
parallel economy represents 38% of GDP (Capital, 1994). This value seems nearly of some 
our ancient estimations, for the period 1990-1992, obtained in a global manner based on a 
generalized model of Laffer curve (Albu, 1994). Recently, the Prime Minister of Romanian 
Government has been shown that the fiscal evasion represents about 60% of the State 
Budget, but the Minister of Internal Affairs showed that the corruption "costs" two thousand 
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_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Country     Year         % of GDP            Method *   Source 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Belgium       1983    35    EGN ** Driessens (1987) 
                                   1983              44                 ESN ** 
Canada                     1961              39                 ESN    Alder-Hawrylyshyn (1978) 
                                    1971              41 
                                    1961              44                 GPN 
                                    1971              40 
Finland                      1980              32                 EGN   Suviranta (1982) 
                                     1980              42                 EGB 
France                       1975              31                 EGN    Chadeau-Fouquet (1981) 
                                     1975              44                 EGB 
                                     1975              44                 GPN 
                                     1983              28                 EGN     Sauvy (1984) 
                                     1983              36                 ESN 
                                     1983              43                 GPN 
W. Germany           1964              34                 EGB     Schettkat (1985) 
                                     1974              33 
                                     1980              32 
                                     1964              47                 GPB 
                                     1974              43 
                                     1980              42 
UK                             1956              44                 EGN     Clark (1958) 
USA              1929              42                 GPN    Nordhaus-Tobin (1972) 
                                    1965              48 
                                    1960              34                 GPB    Weinrobe (1974) 
                                    1970              31 
                                    1960              38                 GPN    Murphy (1978, 1982) 
                                    1970              37 
                                    1976              51 
                                    1960              31                 ESN 
                                    1970              34 
                                    1976              44 
                                    1966              24                 EGB    Kendrick (1979) 
                                    1973              25 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
*  EGN = net marketable global value (equivalent); EGB = brut marketable global value;  
   ESN = net marketable specific value; ESB = brut marketable specific value;  
   GPN = net potential gain; GPB = brut potential gain. 
** Only women. 










3.  METHODS TO APPROACH UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
 
  There is not a single term that allows qualifying unanimous the underground 
activities. Thus, the International Bureau of Employment counts 15 designations whose usage 
differs (Thomas, 1992). Several times it seems to be adequately to qualify this particular 
economy by the terms "informal economy" and "underground economy". From an author to 
other but on the even appoint it is covered more varied definitions. This large diversity of 
approaches of the underground economy there is also regarding to the methods of 
evaluation. 
  In an extensive viewpoint, at macroeconomic level, the underground economy term 
covers the totality of merchant and non-merchant goods and services. There are three modes 
to participate to production and exchange: non-declared remunerated activities, domestic 
production, and other domestic activities (Adair, 1985). Stricto sensu, on the rule, it is to 
distinguish merchant goods and services, that design the non-declared remunerated activities 
and the non-merchant goods and services, that come from the household activities (1). On 
the other hand, as we have already presented, among merchant activities, it takes place there 
to distinguish two components: the fiscal fraud and the "work to the black" and respectively 
the properly criminal activities. In analytic or statistical viewpoints, to estimate the 
underground economy there are two types of approaches: direct and indirect; the former 
cover several methods, generally non - comparable, and end to very divergent evaluations by 
reason of the field more or less extensive that is considered. 
  Considering a recent study (Adair, 1995), we present in table of Annex 3 some 
evaluations. Generally, these are based on an interpretation stricto sensu of the underground 
economy, but several times they do not include the non-merchant activities and the criminal 
component of the underground economy. As we are concerned in this work, the underground 
economy being considered in its larger meaning we consider these evaluations the inferior 
limit of the underground economy. 
 
3.1 Direct Methods 
 
  The micro-approaches employ either well-designed surveys and samples based one 
voluntary reply or tax auditing and other compliance methods (2). In most cases they lead 
only to point estimates (that is, one estimate at a specific time). It is unlikely that they capture 
all "underground" activities, so they can be seen as providing low estimates. Moreover, they 
are unable (at least at present) to provide estimates of the growth of the underground 
economy over time. Therefore, they have at least one considerable advantage: they can 
provide detailed information about the structure and composition of the labour force in the 
underground economy. 
  Several times, direct estimations result from extrapolations realized from inquiries on 
representative household samples. It concerns, on the one hand, inquiries aiming to estimate 
the deduced fiscal fraud of incomplete declarations or leave: it is the case of the inquiry on a 
sample of some 50000 households that has been realized to USA in 1976 (Carson, 1984). It 
concerns, on the other hand, inquiries aiming to evaluate relative expenses to the purchase of 
goods and undeclared services (3), or the offer of "work to the black" of the households which 
was the subject of several researches in Belgium and in Norway (Carson, 1984), as well as in 
Canada (Lacroix and Fortin, 1992; Lemieux et al., 1994). If their extrapolations are disputable, 
these various inquiries - completed by some monographs - allow to apprehend characteristics 
of actors and sectors of the underground economy and to sketch some element analysis. In 
the last years there is an important preoccupation to include the results of direct methods (it is 
to tell the approach at microeconomic level) in national accounts (it is to tell the approach at 
macroeconomic level) by an operation of rectification and by successive iterations. Thus one 
can obtain several levels for some macroeconomic indicators, function of steps covered in the 
process of data integration, obtained by direct methods, in the national accounts and 
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 sometimes one bit to continue even to revise the official GDP.  It is the case of Italy that has 
included the results obtained by inquiries on the job in national accounts. This method told the 
implicit supply of labour can be also as well as considered among the indirect methods (Adair, 
1995). 
 
3.2 Indirect Methods 
 
  The other indirect approaches, aside the implicit labour supply, are: national 
accountancy, monetary approach, and the so-called composite method. 
 
3.2.1 Implicit Labour Supply 
 
  This method focused on the discrepancy between the official and actual labour force. 
If total labour force participation is assumed to be constant, a decreasing official rate of 
participation can be seen as an indicator of the increase in activity in the underground 
economy (4). The weakness of this method is that differences in the rate of participation may 
also have other causes. Moreover, people can work in the underground economy and have a 
job in the official economy. In practice, the implicit labour supply is considered as 
representing the difference between the official activity rate and the actual rate of activity 
measured by various inquires. The active population is thus increased by a coefficient of full-
time jobs resulting from the conversion of multiple-activity and of non-declared activity in full-
time jobs. These jobs, under the strong disputable hypothesis that the productivity of the work 
is identically in both sectors (official and underground), are assigned of an income that can be 
incorporated in the GDP (5). 
  Alone Italy has proceeded to the calculation of the implicit supply of labour and has 
reintegrated it in the GDP, which thus has been officially re-evaluated of some 17.7% in 1987.  
The other European countries challenge this procedure. 
 
3.2.2 National Accounts 
 
  The estimations obtained by the methods based on the national accountancy are 
systematically smaller than those obtained by other methods (Barthelemy, 1982). Among 
causes, there are at least the following two: 1 - in the production viewpoint, as related base is 
considered only the GDP resulted from the economic activities included by convention in the 
national accountancy sphere; 2 - one considers that a part of underground economy is 
already enclosed in the official GDP and, moreover, that an other part of underground 
economy could be also included by successive corrections provided by direct methods of 
investigations (controls, voluntary replies, tax auditing, etc.). 
  Many authors, as well as international or national statistic institutions, consider that 
the national accounts record number of hidden transactions. But, in the same time, the 
Blades's analysis showed that, on the one hand, an important part of the visible economy is 
not registered and that, on the other hand, a fraction of invisible economy make object to an 
official measure (Blades, 1982; Berthelemy, 1986). There is here a notional problem caused 
by the criteria used to appoint a part of economy in report with another part of economy. That 
is why in this work we consider, on the one hand, that the national economy has initially two 
economies: official and underground (hidden). On the other hand, we consider also two 
sectors: visible and invisible. Finally, the visible sector encloses the initial official economy, in 
a first stage, to which one adds afterwards, in a second stage, the part discovered by 
authorities (due to controls, tax auditing, etc.). So, this part of underground economy, initially 
hidden, becomes visible to the end of a year, for instance. Thus, to the end of a year (or other 
considered period, but including at least two stages) the invisible sector will result from the 
initial hidden economy less the activities discovered by authorities, which have been 
transferred into the visible sector (even many times this transfer led to a disappearance of 
those activities or to their reconstruction on official bases). 
  A first modality concerns to estimate size of underground economy on base of the 
discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics. In most countries the size of 
GDP is computed both from the expenditure and income side of national accounts; this often 
reveals that expenditure is higher than income. This initial discrepancy can be seen as a 
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 result of underground activities (6). The weakness of this "fiscal" method is that the 
differences may arise not only because of activities in the underground economy, but also 
because of other errors in measurement statistics (De Leeuw, 1985 and 1986). These 
estimates may therefore be very crude and of questionable reliability. 
  A second modality, most elaborated, represents that that tries to enclose in national 
accounts all components of underground economy, obtained by various direct methods. This 
supposes an iterative process of their integration within national accountancy system and 
consequently re-adjustments of national accounts. Function of integration stage of data, there 
are computed some different levels of GDP and certainly of other macroeconomic indicators. 
  In the last years, this approach made subject of many debates on the definition and 
implementation of European System of Integrated Economic Accounts. So, to elaborate 
national accounts it has been adopted three methods - production method, expanding 
method, and income method - to which corresponds three levels of GDP. Also, at least from a 
theoretical viewpoint, it was accepted that a rigorous analysis of the dynamics of market 
economy supposes the integration of non-marketable activities in the marketable production 
(Archambault, 1980). On the other hand, in a practical viewpoint, it was admitted that, 
because of heterogeneity, it is not possible to make an aggregation between domestic 
activities and the other goods and services already enclosed in the national accounts (Durand 
and Kartchevsky, 1993). In these conditions, within the European System of National 
Accounts, the underground economy must enclose only the following two components: fiscal 
fraud (under-evaluated activities exerted by legal economic units) and work to the black 
(activities exerted by illegal economic units). For each component it was proposed three 
distinct methods (Coin, 1994). 
  To capture data about the fiscal fraud in order to adjust national accounts, there are 
used the following methods: 1 - utilization of results of fiscal controls operated by fiscal 
authorities (France, Netherlands); 2 - "Franz's Method", which yields estimations by 
comparing the income declared by the owner of a small company with the average salary of 
employees from analogous enterprises (Italy); 3 - "implicit" method, which yields estimations 
of fraud computed on demand-side (expenditures for buying goods and services may be 
correlated with the production non-declared of goods and services, that generates non-
declared incomes).  Also, to capture data about the "work to the black", there are used 
following methods: 1 - comparison between labour demand, evaluated by inquiries in the 
production units, and labour supply, evaluated by inquiries in households (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal); 2 - selection of some representative activities and economic units followed by 
detailed economic and social researches or by administrative investigations (France, 
Denmark); 3 - "implicit" method, which produces estimations on labour demand. 
  Generally, in case of the OECD's countries, the estimations of underground economy 
obtained by this category of methods vary between 2% and 6% of GDP (7). 
 
3.2.3 Monetary and Composite Methods 
 
  This category includes two approaches: transactions' approach and respectively 
currency demand approach. 
  First method (included also among the monetary aggregates' approach) developed 
by Feige (1979, 1982) assumes that there is a constant relation over time between the 
volume of transaction and official GDP. Also, to estimate the underground economy, it was 
assumed a base year in which there is no underground economy, and therefore the ratio of 
prices/total transactions to official GDP was "normal" and would have been constant over 
time without underground activities. The weakness of such hypotheses generated many 
critical replies in literature (Thomas, 1992). 
  The currency demand approach assumes that underground transactions are 
undertaken as cash payments, to leave no observable traces for the authorities (8). An 
increase in the size of underground economy will therefore increase the demand for currency. 
To isolate the resulting "excess" demand for currency, an equation for currency demand is 
econometrically estimated over time, with controls for all possible conventional factors, such 
as the development of income, payment habits, interest rates, etc. 
  Adding some other variables (such as: tax rate, public employment, unemployment 
rate, average time work, etc.) to that properly monetary leads to the so-called composite 
  23 
 method. So, for instance, additionally, such variables like the tax burden and government 
regulations, which are assumed to be important major factors that cause people to work in the 
underground economy, are included in the estimation equation. The "excess" increase in 
currency, which is the amount unexplained by the conventional or normal factors, is then 
attributed to the rising tax burden. Figures for the size and development of the underground 
economy can be calculated by comparison of the difference between development of 
currency when the tax burden and government regulations are held at its lowest value, and 
the development of currency with the current (much higher) burden of taxation and 
government regulations. This method is one of the most commonly used. It has been applied 
to the OECD countries (Boeschoten and Fase, 1984; Lundager and Schneider, 1986), but 
has nevertheless been criticized on various grounds (Garcia, 1978; Blades, 1982; Frey and 
Pommerehne, 1984; Klovland, 1984; Schneider, 1986). 
  An interesting approach, which tries to capture the impact of tax system "complexity" 
on the development of underground economy, is that developed of Schneider and Neck 
(1992). We consider that this method may be used to analyse the impact of various 






(1) In USA's case, the domestic work was object to 12 estimations among 1909 and 1973. 
Function of various methods used to estimate (cost of replacement or cost of opportunity), the 
work within households represents between 25% and 50% of GDP (Thomas, 1992). In 
Canada, the disposable data show that the domestic activities represented, in 1981, more 
than 1/3 of GDP: 37.1% in case of replacement cost and respectively 38.3% in that of 
opportunity cost (Chicha-Pontbriand, 1988). In a study of INSEE achieved in 1975, the 
domestic activity in France is evaluated at a level between 50% and 77% of the official GDP 
(Albertini, 1988). Also, Bonke (1992) shows that in most Western countries the value of 
households' production represents between 40% and 50% of GDP. 
(2) Direct method of voluntary sample surveys has been extensively used for Norway 
(Isachsen et al., 1982; Isachsen and Strom, 1985) and for Denmark (Mogensen, 1985). They 
report, on rule, estimations around 5%, but in any case above 10%. 
(3) It is the case of "Family Expenditure Survey" that analyses every budget of about 7000 
households in UK. 
(4) Such studies have been made for Italy (Contini, 1981; Del Boca, 1981) and for United 
States (O'Neill, 1983). 
(5) Despite mentioned inconveniences, we to estimate the limits between can vary the 
underground economy in Romania have used a developed variant of this method.  We 
considered some differences between the two sectors regarding productivity, salary, and 
profit rate (see Chapter 6.3). 
(6) In this question, the most quoted study is that of Macaffe (1980). He obtained by this 
method an estimation of about 3.5% of official GDP for the underground economy in Great 
Britain. Similar approaches are those of Park (1979) for the United States and Petersen 
(1982) for Germany. 
(7) For instance, in a more recent study (Leal, 1994), that presents minutely the application of 
methods of national accounts adjustment on Portugal's economy, the share of underground 
economy is estimated, in 1988, at 6.6% of GDP. 
(8) This method was first used by Cagan (1958), who calculated a correlation of the currency 
demand and the tax pressure as one cause of the underground economy for the United 
States over the period 1919-1955. Then, Gutmann (1979) used the same approach, but done 
not use any statistical procedures; instead he "only" looked at the ratio between currency and 
demand deposits over the period 1937-1976 (Schneider and Neck, 1992). Cagan's approach 
was further developed by Tanzi (1980, 1983) who estimated a currency demand function for 














Estimations of Underground Economy 
(percentage of GNP) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Country          National          Monetary         Currency          Composite            Direct 
                       Accounts       Aggregates        Demand             Method             Estimates 
_____________________________________________________________ 
Belgium            11% (1978)                               15.2% (1980)      12.1% (1978) 
                            (Frank)                                        (Mont)           (Frey, Wreck) 
 
                                                                           19.4% (1980) 
                                                                              (Geeroms) 
                                                                        
                                                                           17.5% (1985) 
                                                                         (Geeroms, Mont) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Canada             16% (1981)      11.1% (1977)        8.4% (1981)        8.7% (1978) 
                            (Ethier)               (Haas)*                (Ethier)           (Frey, Wreck) 
 
                                               10.5-12.8% (1982) 
                                                   (Mirus, Smith)*   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Denmark            6% (1975)                                     6.9% (1980)       11.8% (1978)        5.5% (1980) 
                           (Frey,                                           (Schneider,         (Frey, Wreck)        (Mogensen)  
                           Pommerehne)                                  Lundager) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
France               4.3%* (1985)c                               6.3-6.7% (1979)*     9.4% (1978)      
                              (Willard)                                     (Barthelemy)          (Frey, Wreck) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
W. Germany       4.8% (1974)        27% (1980)         3.7% (1980)          8.6% (1978)      1.1% (1984)  
                            (Petersen)           (Langfelt)b           (Langfelt)            (Frey, Wreck)     (Hellberger, 
                                                                                                                                           Schwarze) 
                                                                                  12% (1980) 
                                                                                (Kirchgassner) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Greece              28.6% (1984)c 
                         (Pavlopoulos)  
 
                          30.2% (1984)c 
                          (Dermenakis) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ireland                                                                           8% (1980) 
                                                                                        (Boyle) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italy                                                 30% (1978)                                      11.4% (1978) 
                                                           (Saba)a                                         (Frey, Wreck) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Netherlands       5% (1979)*             7.5% (1982)                                      9.6% (1978) 
  25 
                         (Broesterhuizen)    (Boechoten, Fass)                               (Frey, Wreck) 
  
                                                       12.7% (1982) 







Country          National          Monetary         Currency          Composite            Direct 




Norway                                                                     6.3% (1978)        9.2% (1978)          4-6% (1983) 
                                                                                 (Isachsen,          (Frey, Wreck)        (Isachsen, 
                                                                                    Klovland,                                             Strom)  
                                                                                         Strom) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Portugal             6.6% (1988)         22% (1981)*        11.2% (1981)* 
                              (Leal)                (Santos A.)        (Coco, Santos E.)   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Spain                                                                                                                               6.5% (1978)       
                                                                                                                                        (Frey, Wreck) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sweden          3.8-6.4% (1979)*      5% (1975)*           7-17% (1978)     13.2% (1978) 
                         (Hansson)              (Hansson)b             (Klovland)        (Frey, Wreck) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
UK                   3.5% (1978)*          15.5% (1979)*         8% (1984)           8% (1978)          2.3% (1977) 
                         (Macafee)                 (Feige)b              (Bhattacha-           (Frey,                  (Dilnot, 
                                                                                        ryya et al.)          Wreck)                 Morris) 
                                     
                                                       12% (1979)* 
                                                       (Mathews)b 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
USA                3.8-6.4% (1977)       14.6% (1982)      4.5-6.1% (1980)      8.7% (1978)      1.5% (1981) 
                             (BEA)                 (Porter, Bayer)a        (Tanzi)              (Frey,                (Smith et al.) 
                                                                                                                 Wreck) 
                          7.1% (1978)          14.6% (1979)         15% (1984)                               
                            (Molefsky)               (Feige)b            (Bhattacharyya et al.) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
* GDP 
a - ratio chash/bank deposit (Gutmann's method) 
b - monetary transactions (Feige's method) 
c - fiscal fraud, non-declared work, etc. (Blades' method) 
 
Sources: Adair (1995), Barthelemy (1988, 1990); Carson (1984); Feige, ed. (1989); Gaertner and Wenig 


















4. FISCAL POLICY AND UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
 
  Many authors consider that budgetary policy and especially fiscal policy have a major 
impact on the development of underground economy. However in literature this subject is 
treated more implicitly within the general models of fiscal policies. 
  Till the present, only few studies analysed explicitly, at macroeconomic level, the 
consequences of ignoring underground economy within economic policies. One of these 
showed that, in the case of the USA's economy, the growth of invisible sector would offer 
explanations for 35% of forecast errors in case of production volume, for 46% of forecast 
errors in case of inflation rate, and for 40% of forecast errors in case of unemployment rate 
(Feige, 1982). 
  In this chapter we present the general context of the theory of fiscal policy and then 
some comparative statistics as well as some methodological aspects of evaluating different 
tax rates. 
     
4.1 General Context 
 
  In the West-European countries, till the First World War, the share of governmental 
expenditure represented below of 10% of GDP. There was the time of "invisible hand" or 
"Gendarme-State", when the role of state is only to assure the security of people and the 
respect of lows. From that time till the present, but more accentuated after the Second World 
War, the intervention of state in the economy increased continuously. Today the state 
became "Providence-State" and the share of total public expenses (including general 
government taxes, local government taxes, and social security expenses) increases up to 
about a half of GDP (comparing with about 15% in 1920s and 30-35% in 1950s). In the 
Scandinavian countries this share is even more than 50% of GDP. 
  Some authors make responsively to this evolution the impact of the Keynes' theory 
and his multiplier of budgetary expenditure. This although Keynes himself showed that the 
maximal level of the share must be around 25% of GDP. However in the last two decades 
more and more the Keynes' theory and consequently the existence of a multiplier effect of 
governmental expenses were contested. Many authors coming from some extensive 
econometrically studies tried to capture the multiplier effect budgetary expenditure on the 
economic growth. Their conclusion was that such effect does not exist in reality but 
governmental expenses are only complementary to the private expenses - expenditure of 
enterprises and respectively of households (Roubini & Sachs, 1989; McCallum, 1990; 
Mundell, 1990; etc.). 
  In these conditions, a new theory emerged. It is the so-called supply-side economics, 
which focused on the efficiency-incentive considerations relating to the taxation; the rising 
dead-weight welfare cost as the tax share of GDP rose; the changing elasticity of government 
revenue with respect to tax rates (the Laffer curve); the high transfer cost of transfers 
(including interest payments on the public debt); the inefficiency of double taxation (on both 
corporate profits dividends received); the inefficiency of taxing capital gains at the same rate 
as personal incomes (especially in an inflationary economy); and the importance of 
entrepreneurial profits in the allocation of investment. The supply-siders stressed also that 
total taxes plus the budget deficit - in other words, government spending - was the correct 
measure of the burden of government in a full-employment economy. If economic transfers 
could be made without friction, the public debt involves a transfer of income from taxpayers to 
bondholders; the debt itself has a dead-weight efficiency cost (Meade, 1945; Modigliani, 
1961). A further disadvantage of a high public debt in a monetary economy is that it invites 
inflation and currency depreciation (Mundell, 1990). 
  An important tool of analysis, and a strong selling point, of supply-side analysis was 
the Laffer curve, relating tax rates and tax revenues. This schedule illustrates the important 
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 fact that tax revenues, as a function of tax rates, is a two-valued function in which the same 
tax revenue can be achieved by both high and low tax rates, except at the maximum revenue 
point where the points coincide. In principle, there is a Laffer curve corresponding to each 
individual tax. As Mundell showed, the aggregate Laffer curve, however, is relevant for 
macroeconomic policy. It would be a mistake to consider the change in tax revenue from a 
single source when a particular tax rate is changed. Particular taxes have a general 
equilibrium effect on other tax revenues, and a correct analysis requires consideration of the 
effect of a change in tax rates on revenues from all taxes in the system. For instance, a cut in 
the corporation income tax that increases investment, employment and output might raise 
income tax revenues from all sources of tax even if the proceeds from corporate profits taxes 
alone decline. Finding the maximum revenue point for each tax in isolation does not maximize 
tax revenues. There is a maximum revenue position corresponding to both money-financed 
and bond-financed government spending. As Bailey (1956) has shown, real government 
revenue from inflationary finance is maximized at that inflation rate at which the decline in real 
money balances (the base of the tax) is equal to the increase in the inflation rate (the rate of 
the tax). Government revenue from bond finance reaches a maximum when bond prices fall 
(interest rates rise) at the same rate that the quantity of bonds is increasing. 
  The proposition that tax rates increase revenues up to a point of maximum revenue 
after which they fall was not at all new (1). Nevertheless, if not new, it was certainly forgotten 
in the half century among 1932 and 1981 when marginal tax rates were never less than 60% 
and hovered at times near 100%. The importance of it looms larger when it is generalized to 
include added tax revenues that arise from increases in output and employment (2). 
  However, in the last years, even international organizations, as International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, adopted a new classification of economic policies. So, there 
are demand-side policies, concentrated on restraint of domestic demand by monetary and 
fiscal measures, and respectively structural or supply-side policies, focused on incentives to 
saving and investment (Khan, 1987). Also, Mundell (1990b) showed that stabilization program 
to have success in long run; the measures of economic policy must provoke favourable 
responses on the supply side of economy. 
  Now, we present a simple global model that may eventually to capture the impact of 
tax rate changing on some important macroeconomic indicators. Being essentially static, 
however it may be developed to capture some dynamic implications in short-run. In this 
sense, we introduced a feedback connection between the level of GDP produced in a year 
and that of GDP in the next year. 
  Coming from the works of McCullum and Mundell, mentioned already above, we 
considered initially the two next relationships to express the GDP and, respectively, the 
aggregate demand: 
 
Y = C + E + T                                                                        (4.1) 
 
AD = C + I + G + Z - M                                                                                     (4.2) 
 
where C is consumption; E - savings; T - taxes; I - investments; G - government expenditures; 
Z - exports; M - imports.   
  Also, we considered the injections (J) and, respectively, withdrawals (W), expressed 
by the following relations: 
 
J = I + G + Z                                                                                                       (4.3) 
 
W = E + T + M                                                                                                     (4.4) 
 
  According to the macroeconomic theory, the equilibrium condition supposes the 
equality between the GDP and AD, what implies the equality between J and W. 
  Considering that the available income (Yd) is, by definition, equal to the sum of 
consumption and savings 
 
Yd = C + E                                                                                                         (4.5) 
 
and the model represented by Figure 4.1, we can write the relationship between the efficiency 
of investments (b) and the interest rate (i) as following: 
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b = ( DYd / I ) =  i / [ 1 - ( I / E ) ]                                                                       (4.6) 
 
where DYd represents the yearly absolute increase of the available income. 
 
  On this basis, now we can express the national net savings (En) by the following 
relations: 
 
En = E - I = E - [ E x ( b - i ) / b ] = E x i / b                                                          (4.7) 
 
  Introducing the following notations: 
 
c = C / Yd ;  t = T / Y ;  q = E / Yd ;  g = G / Y ;  m = M / Y ;  z = Z / Y 
 
the diagram of the global model shows as in Figure 4.2 and the relationship of equilibrium will 
be: 
 




(  En  ) + (  - Di  ) + (   De   ) = 0                                                                             (4.9) 
 
where Di is the internal public debt and De - the external public debt. 
  Dividing by Y and taking into account of what we have exposed above, the last 
relationship can be written under the next form: 
 
t - g + { a x i / [ ( 1 - t ) x g - i ] } + m - x = 0                                                         (4.10) 
 
where a = I / Y ;  g = DY / I = b / ( 1 - t ) ; and DY is the yearly absolute increase of GDP. 
  Now, grouping terms in the equilibrium equation by the parameter t, the relation 
(4.10) can be written as following:  
 
( - g ) x t2 + ( g - i + g x g - m x g + z x g ) x t +  
                
                           + ( g x i - g x g  + a x i + m x g - m x i - z x g + z x i ) = 0          (4.11) 
 
  Considering the left member of the equation as a function of variable t, the equilibrium 
equation will be written under the next form: 
 
F ( t ) = - g x t2 + k1 x t + k2 = 0                                                                           (4.12) 
 
where k1 and k2 are coefficients.  
  The analysis of the behaviour of the function F has permitted to separate the inflation 
zones and respectively the decreasing inflation zones, as is shown in the table of Annex 4.1. 
  The model can be developed by the introduction of some other quasi-exogenous 
functions to express the behaviour of investments, consumption, etc. But, in this case, new 
complicated problems will emerge (Albu, 1994). 
  Generally, the function F may be considered in terms of Laffer curve. So, after some 
algebraic transformations, we can express the amount of taxes (T) as a function of tax rate 
(t), as following: 
   
T ( t ) = - b* x Y x t2 + Y x ( 1 + b* - b* x c ) x t                                                 (4.13) 
 
where b* = DY / E. 
  Regarding the analyses of economic dynamics in medium-run, a large variety of 
alternatives of fiscal or budgetary policies can be analysed coming from the Hénin's 
approach, based on a calibrated model of endogenous growth (Hénin and Ralle, 1994). Also, 
Day (1994) developed a model of business cycles by including the tax rate as an essential 
behavioural parameter. Function of some threshold-values of the tax rate, he separated 
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 various regimes on the map of GDP and on that of T. Also, the model may produce chaos in 









4.2 Trends in Government Spending and Taxation 
 
  In case of Western countries, throughout the past half century, there has been a 
steady increase in the share of government spending, G, in the total national product, Y, as 
how is shown in the Table 4.1. What is notable, however, is the sharp rate of increase in G/Y 
beginning in the mid-1960s. During the period 1973-82, the share of government experienced 
its most rapid jump for any sub-period during the past 50 years. After 1982, government 
spending as a share of GDP seems to be stabilized, and in some countries has even fallen. 
 
 
         Table 4.1. Public expenditure in selected OECD countries (% of GDP) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Year                1938      1950      1960      1965      1973      1982      1985      1990 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
France                      21.8      27.6       34.6       38.4       38.5       51.1      52.4       49.9 
Germany                   42.4      30.4       32.4       36.6       41.5       49.4      47.2       46.0 
Japan                        30.3      19.8       17.5       19.0       22.4       33.7      32.7       32.3 
Netherlands               21.7      26.8       33.7        38.7      45.8       61.6      60.2      55.6 
UK                             28.8      34.2       32.2        36.1      40.6       48.2      47.7       42.1 
US                             18.5      22.5       27.0        27.4      36.6       30.5      36.7       36.7 
Italy                            29.2      30.3       30.1        34.3      37.8       47.6      50.8      53.0 
_____________________________________________________________        
 
Sources: Lybeck and Henreckson (1988) for 1938, 1950, 1985; OECD Economic Outlook for 1973 and 
1965; "La dépense publique en France: évolution sur trente ans et comparaison internationale", Journal 
Officiel de la République Française, N° 26, 1994 for 1960 and 1990. 
 
 
  In the same time, until 1973, government deficits were sufficiently low in most 
countries to lead to a falling ratio of net public debt to GDP, which we denote as D/Y. This is 
in the line with Barro's prediction of a falling debt-GDP ratio during periods of peacetime 
(Barro, 1979 and 1987). But after 1973, the trend was reversed: almost every OECD 
economy experienced a significant rise in the debt-GDP ratio (Roubini & Sachs, 1989). 
  There is a huge literature concerning the causes and possible remedies by budgetary 
policies, but it is not our main preoccupation in this study. Here, we note only that the 
estimation of the impact of budgetary policy on the size and dynamics of underground 
economy represents a very complicated problem due to the existence of many factors of 
influence varying by country and by period. Some of these are: the structure of public 
expenditure and of receipts of taxes, differences between incomes (from work, property, 
capital, etc.) from the viewpoint of taxation degree; the behaviour and reaction of tax-payers 
to the measures of fiscal policy adopted, etc. Also, another obstacle against to capture the 
impact of tax policy on underground economy, at national level, represents the difficulty to 
evaluate accurately the effective tax rates in case of each category of taxpayers. This 
problem is important for to assure correctly some international comparisons. In this subject 
we mention a very useful study elaborated recently by Mendoza et al. (1994) within the IMF. 
  Regarding the budgetary policy, and fiscal policy especially, in Eastern countries after 
1989, we can separate two distinct periods. In the first year of transition, it was a massive 
liberalization of fiscal policy following to the collapse of the former planned-socialist system. 
But this liberalization, which in normal conditions must be followed by a transfer of activity 
from invisible sector to that visible, had not the expected effect. There are multiple causes of 
this unexpected effect, which are related to the general process of economic transition from a 
central-planned system to the one based on the free market. Then, in the second phase of 
transition, due to the accentuated economic crisis, followed by a deterioration of the trade 
balance, and by a huge growth of public debt, external debt, and budgetary deficit, the fiscal 
policy was reinforced and fiscal pressure on incomes increased. 
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   For instance, in Romania, the share of public expenditure in total GDP, expressed in 
the current prices of each year, has the following evolution: 47.1% in 1989, 35.8% in 1990, 
35.1% in 1991, 33.7% in 1992, and 27.8% in 1993. But, after our estimations, using a proper 
method, in constant prices (prices of the year 1989), it was registered the following levels: 
47.1% in 1989, 37.9% in 1990, 41.4% in 1991, 48.2% in 1992, and 45.5% in 1993. However, 






(1) It must have been known to wise chancellors of the ancient world devising tax systems, as 
David Hume (Rotwein, 1955) or Jules Dupuit (1844). 
(2) There is a separate "Laffer curve" corresponding to each level of employment. It is easy to 
see how a tax cut, even in a Keynesian model, can raise aggregate tax revenue. According to 
conventional Keynesian theory, a tax cut results in a multiplied increase in income and 
therefore in a smaller reduction in tax revenue than if income had stayed constant. If, 
however, the tax reduction stimulates investment, the budget deficit may actually be reduced, 














































     
Annex 4.1 
_____________________________________________________________ 
                                
                                                                γ > 0 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                           ( 1 - t ) x γ - i > 0              ( 1 - t ) x γ - i < 0 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                           F < 0  - inflation               F > 0  - inflation 


























5. THEORETIC MODELS 
 
  The last crisis of the 1980s has promoted the underground economy to prominence 
in the literature. Also, many works focused on underground or informal economy in 
developing countries and recently, since 1989 in East-European countries. But, in opinion of 
some authors, while the underground sector is now well studied from an empirical or historical 
viewpoint, the theoretical literature continues to be sparse. However, some recent 
contributions (Stark, 1982; Adair, 1985; Chauduhuri, 1989; Schneider and Neck, 1992; 
Gibson and Kelley, 1994) have begun to provide the foundations of a theory of the 
underground or informal economy (1). 
  In this chapter, after a general presentation of the trends in the specialized literature, 
we shall concentrate on the main results of the models, regarding possible theoretical 
developments as well as some implications on the macroeconomic policy plan. We will use 
many of these in the next chapter to construct some quantitative models designed to evaluate 
the size and dynamics of underground sector, especially in the case of Romania's economy. 
    
5.1 General Context 
 
  As it is known, the fiscal policy is considered many times main instrument within the 
economic theory and the tax rate as an essential parameter. 
  There is a vast literature concerning the impact of fiscal policy and tax rate on 
macroeconomic stabilization programs. New developments are registered regarding this 
subject from the emergence of supply-side economics. Non-ignoring the regulatory role of 
government budget, the main idea is that the expansion of tax rate level over some 
thresholds, continuing to have positive effects on the demand-side and consequently on 
stabilization process in short-run, can have negative impact on the supply-side part of 
economy. In the long run, the stabilization process itself will be affected. The general 
explanation is that an increasing tax rate may limit the stimulation to invest of the private 
(capitalistic) firms, which is the main factor of development in a free market economic system. 
  Despite the fact that there are many complications, at macroeconomic level, induced 
by the structural changes, significant differences between the responses to various taxes and 
as well as by the business cycles and many other factors, however, the mentioned impact 
was demonstrated, at least as a general tendency in the long-run. Whether, the subject of 
how tax rate and fiscal policy influence the evolution of economy is extensively treated in 
literature, the impact on underground sector is more spire till the present. 
  Generally accepted the idea that an increase of tax rate provokes a migration of 
activity from visible sector to invisible sector, the remained problem is what is the intensity of 
the correlation between the tax rate level and proportion of this migration. Moreover, there is 
the problem of how should change this intensity and by what quantity under the impact of 
other economic or/and non-economic factors. To evaluate some essential parameters of this 
transfer of activity (migration) and to produce explanations accepted by standard economics 
are the main goals of the underground economy modelling. However, the main problem is 
that studying underground economy implies many times to evade from the cannons and rules 
of standard economics. So, some times, the underground economy approach makes 
necessary a general re-discussion of the fundamentals and taboos of standard economics. 
That is why the approach of underground economy provokes frequently disputes between the 
economists coming from different mainstreams. For instance, we can mention the limits of the 
National Accounts System (based on standard economics conception) occurred when it was 
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 desired to estimate the size of underground sector, non-taking about the case when it was 
desired to quantify its dynamics or the disputes held by the problem of implementation of 
reforms within this system. 
  
5.2 Types of Approaches 
 
  There are many works that treat the psychological effect of the modern State 
development that has been to dig an important gap between the government and the citizen. 
Expressions as "government", "State", "Authority", "Downing Street", "Hotel Matignon", or all 
simply "they", throw the image of an anonymous power, a tyrant that gradually dominates the 
life itself and imposes all sorts of disagreeable homework; the fact to pay its tax is simply one 
of these.  It seems perfectly natural that nobody pays its good tax taste to such body. Some 
do not hesitate to see in the underground economy a refuge against the will of the State to 
organize the society. A denunciation illustrated by the development of "second economy" in 
Eastern countries (2). 
  Duchêne affirms that the main "production" of a state is the law. Sometimes this 
production becomes an inside goal. Than it is a vicious cycle: the state produces many laws 
of which some are not respected in practice and then the state produces more laws to 
counteract this inefficiency in practice and then more laws are not respected in practice and 
so on. By his opinion, to which we also are partisans, to be optimal a state must produce only 
those laws that will have a chance to be respected in practice. Each over-output relating to 
this optimal level will generate inefficiency and perverse effects as well as an increasing 
underground economy (3). 
  By describing attitudes of taxpayers, four reasons can be evoked - coercive nature of 
fiscal policy, lack of identification with the administration, aspects relying to the behaviour face 
to risk and the inefficiency of administrative management - that have been processed in detail 
in many works.  It is possible that such arguments do not belong to the area of the economic 
science, but we mention already that the study of the underground economy transcends the 
standard economic theory. We think that there is no pain to mention these subjects, for the 
purpose to provide some psychological and sociological foundations to some aspects of the 
underground economy. There is a problem of more, and the economists are certainly 
qualified to process it, it is that the threshold of taxation and the other rises of taxes by the 
State. This is not to properly speak a fifth repugnance reason to pay its taxes; this new 
argument gives a new dimension to each of the four proceeding causes.  More again, this 
aspect of the problem emphasizes the influence of the four repugnance reasons to pay its 
taxes. To describe it in a sentence, more the fiscal cost is strong, greater will be the desire to 
avoid paying for each proceeding reason. The Laffer curve according to whether receipts of 
the State begin by increasing, and then decrease beyond one certain threshold, as the 
average taxation rate increases, has put this phenomenon in obviousness. Gutmann that 
thinks that the increase of the rate of taxation incites increasingly individuals to escape the 
fiscal controls by penetrating in the sphere of underground activities to the point to deform the 
curve of Laffer has amended this curve of Laffer. According to Gutmann the Laffer curve must 
be in fact deformed toward the right part of graph. These problems appear them in detail in 
the next section of chapter. The weight of the fiscal payments and social contributions, it is to 
tell the obligatory payments, has increased constantly during this century and its rate of 
growth is now such that the acceleration is perceptible in an alone generation. These aspects 
we have already approached in the former chapter. 
  Generally speaking, high taxation rates, few controllers of taxes and relatively weak 
amend for fiscal fraud contribute to persuade peoples to take their chance not to be 
discovered. On a theoretic plan, the model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) strengthen this 
position. The problem of taxpayer consists indeed in maximize the hoped usefulness of the 
obtained income if he develops a fiscal fraud strategy. 
  Now, we present this model where a risk-averse taxpayer is allowed to declare less 
than his actual income, W. Declared income, X > 0, is taxed by a constant rate, θ  > 0, 
whereas undeclared income, W - X, is taxed, if detected, by a higher rate, π. The taxpayer 
chooses X* to maximize his expected utility: 
 
E [ U ] = ( 1 - p ) . U ( Y ) + p . U ( Z )                                                        (5.1) 
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where p is the (exogenously given) probability of detection, and 
 
Y = W - θ . X                                                                                                     (5.2) 
 
Z = W - θ . X - π . ( W - X )                                                                  (5.3) 
 
represent his income in case of detection and non-detection, respectively. The first-order 
condition for the maximization of (5.1) is 
 
dE [ U ] / dX  =  - θ . ( 1 - p ) . U' ( Y ) + ( π - θ ) . p . U' ( Z ) = 0                      (5.4) 
 
from which the taxpayer's response to a change in θ may be derived. This is given by 
 
dX* / dθ  = - D-1. ( 1 - p ) . U' ( Y ) . { θ . X . [ RA ( Z ) - RA ( Y ) ] - [ π / ( π - θ ) ] }   (5.5) 
 
where D = θ2 . ( 1 - p ) . U'' ( Y ) + ( π - θ )2 . p . U'' ( Z ) < 0 is the second-order condition for 
the maximization of (5.1) and RA ( I ) = - U" ( I ) / U' ( I ) > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk-
aversion measure, evaluated at I = Y, Z. 
  Under decreasing absolute risk-aversion [ RA ( Z ) > RA ( Y ) ], the sign of (5.5) is 
ambiguous, as asserted by Allingham and Sandmo. 
  Since this work, a sizable literature applying economic analysis to tax evasion has 
appeared (Yitzhaki, 1974; Isachsen and Strom, 1980; Clotfelter, 1983; Feldstein, 1983; 
Cowell, 1985; Pestieau and Possen, 1991; Yaniv, 1994; Jung et al., 1994). 
  Many of the theoretical papers on this topic have used models in which a 
representative taxpayer receives income from a single source and then decides how much of 
that income to declare to the tax authorities. While such studies reveal much about the 
behaviour of a single underreporting agent, they do not incorporate one important empirical 
fact about tax evasion, namely that the extent to which one evades taxes is strongly 
correlated with the source of one's income (Clotfelter, 1983). 
  In the recent years, several theoretical papers have recognized that opportunities for 
evasion differ among occupations. Such papers have also emphasized that these differences 
may affect an agent's labour market behaviour. An agent may, in other words, base his labour 
supply decisions in part on the ability to evade taxes. Theoretical models that recognize tax 
evasion to be easier when income is received from certain sources (self-employment, for 
instance) rather than other sources (corporate employment, more frequently) typically 
assume that the economy has two sectors: one in which evasion is impossible, presumably 
because of tax holding and information reporting, and another in which evasion is possible. 
Such papers are often referred to as studies of the underground economy. 
  One early example of two-sector model of tax evasion is that examined by Watson 
(1985). Then several other authors have investigated related two-sector evasion models, 
which added some realistic features by including as variable labour supply and various 
demand-side considerations (Fortin and Hung, 1987; Kesselman, 1989). They, however, also 
remove a feature by assuming that agents active in the avoidable sector declare none of their 
income to the tax authorities. Furthermore, these papers do not consider how the relationship 
between the tax rate and the size of the avoidable sector is affected by attitudes toward risk 
bearing. Such problems, on the other hand, are approached by other authors (Jung et al., 
1994). 
  Generally, the models focused on the situation of underground economy in Western 
countries. Coming from the fundamental tension in the applied literature, which refers to the 
interpretation of the labour force in underground sector (4), Gibson and Kelley (1994) 
developed a theoretical model, which, aside of general problems of underground economy 
focused on the case of informal sector in developing countries. An important conclusion 
derived from their model is that the costs in the informal sector must be greater than in formal 
sector. Then, if the informal sector uses more resources per unit of output, the social surplus 
will expand as the formal sector replaces the informal sector. The outcome, however, 
depends upon the existing distribution of income, which further complicates matters. 
  36 
   For evaluate the impact of underground sector on the national economy in the case 
of a central-planned system as in former Eastern countries, by disposable information to us, 
the alone rigorous model is that elaborated by Professor Hénin (1986). Covering a wide 
number of "regimes" of disequilibrium, the model can be used as an important instrument of 
analysis in the centralized economies. 
  Some studies seem to confirm the hypothesis of Laffer's curve model (Lemieux et.all, 
1994), but other authors contest the availability of this model at least at macroeconomic level 
(Pestieau, 1989). 
 
5.3 Generalized Laffer's Curve Model 
 
  The main goal of our investigation is to find if the simple Laffer curve model is able to 
produce some relevant results for fiscal policy or it remains restricted to the already known 
results. Because many other models used by economists seem to be close by the Laffer 
curve type, possibly, some conclusions of our investigation should be extended.  
 
5.3.1 A General Presentation of the Model 
 
  Many times, in the existing literature the Laffer curve model is represented by a 
simple concave square curve. This expresses graphically the amount of tax income (T) as a 
function of tax rate (x), having two intersections with the abscise axis and a maximum value 
for x = 50% of total income or GDP. 
  In fact, this figure represents only a part of the general graph of Laffer curve model, 
which derives from a fundamental hypothesis, also intensively used in many other economic 
models. The hypothesis states that within a given system having two complementary 
elements, if one of the two constituents grows by an amount, then the other element 
decreases automatically by an identical quantity. In terms of the underground economy 
mechanism, the hypothesis states that within the economic system, having only two 
constitutive sectors - official or visible sector and invisible or underground sector - when the 
visible sector decreases, the invisible sector increases in a similar manner and vice-versa. In 
a static analysis the amount of all quantitative changes must be zero, but in a dynamic 
analysis the amount of all relative changes must be zero. 
  Generally, it is introduced an additional hypothesis that gives the sense of 
modification when the other variable, considered exogenous, changes. Now, the problem is 
that in fact this variable will be never completely exogenous in the case of economic models. 
As a rule, it is conceived as a relative indicator or as a share, being even indirectly related to 
the two elements of the system (5). The mentioned situation can generate a feed back 
relation (more exactly, cascades of feed back relations), which may alter our initial model. 
The common solution is to ignore this feed back relation, that is equivalent to be interested 
only in a very closed region of the entire dynamics of the system, namely around the static or 
fixed equilibrium. Other solution, more productive regarding the progress of economics is to 
consider the static equilibrium only as a particular case. In terms of Laffer curve model, the 
additional hypothesis states: when the variable tax rate increases the base of tax rate 
decreases, that is the income available to taxation decreases. The cause can reside in a 
migration of economic activity from visible sector to invisible sector. 
  Concerning the analysis of Laffer curve model, we present in Figure 5.1 the complete 
map, where both functions of tax rate - the income produced in the visible sector (Yv) and 
respectively the income produced in the underground sector (Yu) - are supposed to be linear 
curves. Also, it is shown the resulting curve of the total available income (Yd). The model 
presented in Figure 5.1 can be expressed by the following system of equations: 
 
T(x)    = x . Yv                                                                                      (5.6) 
 
Yv(x)   =  c1 . x + c2                                                        (5.7) 
 
Taking into account that Yv passes the points (0;k) and (1;0) results -c1=c2=k, where k 
represents the total income produced in the economy. Now, substituting (5.6) by (5.7) it 
results the new expression for T: 
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T(x)  = - k . x2 + k . x                                                       (5.8) 
 
which also can be written as: 
 




Yu(x) = k . x                                                                                  (5.9) 
 
it results that 
 
T  =  x . ( k - Yu)  =  x . Yv                                                         (5.10) 
 
Now, the deduced equation of the total available income (Yd) will be: 
 
Yd  = k - T = Yu + ( Yv - T )                                                         (5.11) 
 
which also can be written as: 
 
Yd (x) = k . ( x2 - x + 1)                                                                  (5.12) 
 
  It results that when the governmental income from taxes is maximized, at x = 50% of 
Yv, the available income of  agents (firms and households) is minimal. When x = 0 and T = 0, 
Yd equals the total income (k) and the entire activity becomes visible (Yd = k = Yv). On the 
other hand, when x = 1 and T = 0, Yd equals also total income, but now the entire activity 
becomes invisible (Yd = k = Yu). A deeper analysis of the model permits the identification of 
other important points on the map:  Tmax =  k/4 and Ydmin =  3k/4 (both for x = 1/2 of Yv). 
  Although in this chapter we shall continue to investigate the presented version of 
Laffer curve model, now we consider usefully presenting briefly other possible versions of this 
model. So, if we replace the two linear functions Yv(x) and Yu(x), by non-linear functions it 
can obtain other possible graphical representations. In cases presented in Figures 5.2 and 
5.3, the income tax curve is deformed to left side and respectively to right side. In the last 
case, income tax curve is so-called Gutmann curve. Also, by some authors this case would 
seem to be the most adequately to represent the economic situations. In the case of discrete 
version of Laffer curve, we shall show that stability of the system depends not only on the tax 
rate level, but also on both the tax rate value and its rate of change. We can see that these 
Laffer curve versions cover many models frequently used in the economic literature (6). 









































5.3.2 Developing Continuous Version of the Model 
 
  In this section we called some results derived from the Catastrophe Theory or, more 
generally, from the Structural Stability Theory (7). Now, to elaborate a continuous-time model 
we consider that the main equation of Laffer curve model can be derived from an existing 
potential function V (x;m): 
 
dV / dx = f ( x ; m ) = 0                                                             (5.13) 
 
where x is the rapid variable of the system and m - the slow or control variable (both are 
implicitly functions of time). In our case, we chose the following potential function: 
 
V ( x ; m ) = ( -  x3 ) / 3  +  ( x2 ) / 2  -  m . x                                            (5.14) 
 
to which it corresponds the following equation of potential surface: 
 
- x2  +  x  -  m  =  0                                                                         (5.15) 
 
  Comparing this with the relation of T already obtained in the first section of paper, it 
results that in terms of Laffer curve model the slow variable has the following expression: 
 
m = T / k                                                                                                          (5.16) 
 
Considering the analysis of the graph of function V, it results some threshold values of m. So, 
for x having values among 0 and 1, there are the following cases: 
  when   0 < m <  3 / 16,  V has 3 real roots (0 and other two separated); 
      when         m =  3 / 16,  V has 2 real roots (0 and an other double root); 
      when    3 / 16 < m < 1,  V has only 0 as real root . 
The representation of function V is shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
 









  A very important threshold value of parameter m is 1/4, where the maximum, 
minimum, and inflexion points are confounded. This remarkable value was also obtained in 
the simple version of the Laffer curve model. Other important conclusions concerning 
evolution and stability of the system are followings: 
  - there are two equilibrium curves - a stable equilibrium curve (C1) and an unstable 
equilibrium curve (C2); 
  - for values of x smaller than (C2) the trajectories are attracted to (C1) (the long-run 
effect); 
  - for values of x smaller then m the attraction is stronger than in case of greater 
values of x than m; 
  - for value of x greater than C2 the system is strong attracted in an intense troubled 
zone (hole) as well as in the zone beyond m = 1/ 4; 
  - a rich menu of alternatives can be deduced by investigation of the function V map 
moreover this can offer some larger possibilities of statistical data interpretation. 
  A decisive problem represents the estimation of k. If this would be quantified we 
should adopt many desired alternatives knowing their consequences. The resulting decisive 
importance of quantifying k strongly contradicts the authors who consider underground 
economy having insignificant or neutral influence on the entire economic system and 
consequently it must be ignored or strongly repressed. The analysis demonstrates that its 
existence assures that m < x. If it would be eliminated, then m equals x, which by rule is 
greater than 1/ 4 of Yv, and for this point of graph as it was shown the system is strongly 
attracted in a so-called hole-region (8). However, the remaining question is how we could 
solve or at least to avoid the problem of the size of k and implicitly of underground sector. For 
this we shall try to adopt a discrete model as an alternative. 
 
5.3.3 A Discrete Version of the Model 
 
  Now, we recall the equation (5.8) of T, which, dividing by Yv, can be rewritten as: 
 
x  =  a x . ( 1 - x )                                                                     (5.17) 




a = k / Yv                                                                                    (5.18) 
 
  Considering parameter a as an essential parameter that assures the dynamics of the 
system within the discrete model, we can write the equation (5.17) as following: 
 
xt  =  a . xt-1 . ( 1 -  xt-1 )                                                                   (5.19) 
 
  This equation (which represents a canonical form of May's equation) possesses a 
wide range of dynamic behaviour, which is well known in the specialized literature. Limiting 
our attention to the initial conditions of the dynamics of x included in the interval [ 0 ; 1 ], the 
following "windows" of a were identified: 0 < a < 1, x moves monotonously towards the 
stationary solution x = 0; 1 < a < 2 ,  x moves monotonously towards the stationary solution x 
= ( a - 1 ) / a;  2 < a < 3 ,  x converges with a flattened oscillatory movement to the stationary 
solution x = ( a - 1 ) / a ;  3 < a < 4 , x demonstrates a complex of permanent oscillations. For 
a = 3.57, one can observe an infinite number of fixed points with different periodicity and an 
infinite number of different periodical cycles; there also exist innumerable combinations of 
initial conditions from which completely a-periodical, although bounded, trajectories begin; it is 
from this threshold that the chaotically region begins. For a > 4, the model explodes, that 
confirms the result obtained in the continuous version of model. 
  In order to estimate the value of parameter or its trend many methods could be used. 
Some of them are shown in Annex 5.1, where we presented an application on available data 
in case of French economy, including calculus of fractal dimension (Hurst exponent). Here, 
we present some conclusions: (a) the model that possesses the properties of chaos is 
verified and economically consistent, since a transformation that arrives at the canonical form 
is possible; (b) the values of parameters, however, are quite far from their chaotic bifurcation. 
Our application on the time series of tax rate in the case of France among 1973 and 1993 
demonstrated value of parameter a around 1.8. Other studies obtained similar results. For 
instance, applying a similar model to the time series of the growth rate of GDP in case of Italy 
among 1960 and 1982, Candela and Gardini (1986) obtained the following estimation for 
parameter a: 1.34 for the period 1960-1974 and 0.68 for the period 1975-1982. To note that in 
our model the values of parameter a smaller than 1 value are excluded. In short, according to 
our observations, the chaotic model was verified, but it did not produce chaos in this case. It 
remains to verify in cases of other countries and other periods. In other economic fields, such 
as financial markets, it was already demonstrated that the chaotic model produces chaos. 
 
5.3.4 Developments in Continuous Version 
 
  Introducing the new values of parameter as derived from the discrete-time analysis, 
we obtained the following system of relations in case of the continuous version: 
 
m ( x )  =  - x2  +  x                                                                               (5.20) 
 
a ( x )  =   1 / ( 1 - x )                                                                                (5.21) 
 
Now, the relation between the two parameters can be written as follows: 
 
m    =    ( a - 1 ) / a2                                                                 (5.22) 
 
and the graphical representation is shown in Figure 5.5. On this graph, we can see three 
remarkable points of parameter a: for a smaller than 1, the parameter m becomes negative 
(this means that the value 1 represents the lower limit of parameter a in case of our model, 
corresponding to the situation in which k = Yv; for parameter a equal to value 2, parameter m 
has a maximum value (this is the case of the well-known value 1/4); for parameter a equal to 
value 3, the function of m has an inflexion point. However, from the previous section we know 
that for parameter a having a value greater than 3 the way to chaos is already open. Thus, 
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 now we can affirm that for our Laffer curve model solely the condition m<1/4 is not sufficient. 
So, this condition must be doubled by the last restriction demonstrated on the scale of 








  Taking into account new information, some deeper analysis in case of the continuous 
map of potential function V demonstrates that for the value m=2/9 the maximum’s branch 
(curve C2) has an inflexion point on the potential surface. This is the image of inflexion point 
of function m(a) in the potential function representation (in our graphical representation this 
inflexion point on V surface does not appear too clear). Only by introducing parameter a in 
analysis permitted us to discover it. In economic terms, the model shows, under the 
conditions of presented analysis, that a rise in the share of underground sector to values in 
the proximity or over 2/3 of k provokes firstly multi-cycles and then emergence of a chaotic 
behaviour of the system. In contrast with the authors considering that the adoption of the 
Laffer curve model will led to a drastically reduction in tax pressure and an unlimited increase 
of underground sector, from our analysis resulted that this model (and its possible 
generalizations) includes in fact a limitation of underground sector and moreover it can show, 
at least from a theoretic viewpoint, when this limit was reached.  
  Surely, the analysis based on Laffer curve model can be refined further more by 
considering new parameters, such as: structure by sources - taxes and bonds - of 
governmental expenditure, structure by sources - capital, salaries, dividends, wealth, etc. - of 
governmental income from taxes, etc. Unfortunately, this development introduces new 
complicated deformations in Laffer curve model, new non-linearity, and surely the model must 
be fundamentally changed. But the solution will be also to analyse separately grouped the 
relations and variables, considering simultaneously only two or, under special conditions, 
three of them. In terms of the models derived from our existing economic theory this is the 
manner of restriction (9). Our results may be considered as an interlocution in the chaos/ 
chance debate, on one hand, and in the standard economics/supply-side economics debate, 
on the other hand. In fact, the non-linear estimate is one that is confirmed but the irregularities 
are explained by the stochastic, not the deterministic component, inasmuch as the control 
parameter never reaches either the chaotic or the oscillatory bifurcation. A similar relation 
seems to exist in the second case. Our present results in case of the tax rate policy and its 
close supply-side analysis are promising at least for three reasons: 1 - France does not 
represent the extreme case in the taxation field; 2 - the estimated value of parameter a is 
greater than other estimations (as it was shown above) and moreover it is situated in the 
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 neighbourhood of the oscillatory bifurcation zone; 3 - some important factors such as 
distribution of sources used to finance the governmental expenditure (which could lead to an 






(1) An extended review of the existing literature on informal economy can be found in Porters 
et al. (1989). 
(2) In opinion of some authors, there exists an indisputable relationship between the 
development of the underground economy and the role of the State in the social and 
economic life. So, the strong development of the parallel economy in Eastern countries is, to 
a certain extent, a retort of the society to the imposed and ineffective economic system 
(Debare, 1992). 
(3) Professor Duchêne exposed his opinions within the GRATICE's Workshop, organized at 
University of Paris XII - Val de Marne in June 1995 (Duchêne, 1995). Also, he presented an 
interesting paper on the underground economy in the transition period in the East-European 
countries (Duchêne, 1995). 
(4) For some, the informal sector represents a vibrant band of small-scale entrepreneurs who 
will eventually emerge as the foundation for capitalistic development. This viewpoint is 
opposed to the "reserve army of unemployment" that sees the informal sector as surplus 
labour to be absorbed in the process of growth and accumulation. 
(5) This represents one of the most important differences between economics and the 
experimental scientific disciplines, such as physics, for instance. 
(6) Here, we emphasize that whatever model based on the mentioned complementary 
hypothesis and additional hypothesis, in the shown conditions, is qualitatively identical with 
the Laffer curve model (so, in this class it can be included models as: investment - 
consumption; governmental sector - private sector; enterprise sector - household sector, etc.). 
Under these conditions, we can affirm that it was wrong to criticize only the Laffer curve 
model as being unreasonably or psychologically and not the other models from the same 
class. For instance, the Laffer curve model may cover the so-called currency demand 
methods, where is supposed that in a base year there is no underground economy. This 
assumption is equivalent, in terms of Laffer curve model presented in Figure 5.1, to a 
movement of the Yu line from the origin of coordinate axes (0; 0) to an other point situated on 
the abscise axis, that corresponding to the initial value of tax rate in the considered base 
year.  
(7) In this version of paper we omitted the part of theoretical argumentation. However, here 
we present only a brief incursion in the recent literature and some possible connections with 
the subject of underground economy development. So, in the last years there was an 
increasing preoccupation of scientists from mathematical economics field for studying the 
dynamic economic systems in non-linearity and discontinuity conditions. Although the 
disputes between the theorists representing the two great theories (the catastrophe theory, as 
a special case of bifurcation theory, whose emphasis is on discontinuity in the large; and the 
chaos theory, and its close relative fractal geometry, whose emphasis is on discontinuity in 
the small) continued, there are signs of a reconciliation within a meta-theoretical sketch of the 
General Theory of Economic Discontinuities at least concerning elaboration of some works of 
syntheses (Lorenz, 1989; Rosser,1991; Brock et al., 1991; Zhang, 1991; Medio and Gallo, 
1992; Puu, 1993; Day, 1994) or including in the same book authors belonging to different 
mainstreams (Grandmont, ed., 1988; Barnett et al., eds., 1989; van der Ploeg, ed., 1990; 
Pesaran and Potter, eds, 1993; Semmler, 1994; Creedy and Martin, 1994). Based on new 
mathematical developments (Grandmont, 1988), an increasing number of studies investigate 
non-linearity in models of economic dynamics. Some of the most important problems from the 
available literature which have been approached recently are: endogenous business cycles 
and competitive market dynamics; overlapping generations models; speculative bubbles and 
crashes; optimal accumulation in two-sector models; imperfect financial intermediation; 
multiplier-accelerator models; cobweb model; dynamics of the perfect foresight and rational 
expectations; dynamics of the adaptive expectations; discrete time model of monetary 
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 dynamics. An interesting approach relatively to our research is the Chiarella's "analysis of the 
effect of time lags and nonlinearities in macroeconomic models including the government 
budget restraint", where taxation of disposable income and bond financing regime are 
considered (Chiarella, 1990). Weddepohl who analyses types of chaotic equilibrium within the 
overlapping generation models makes another approach. He demonstrated that a backward 
perfect foresight equilibrium path can be: stationary; converging to a stationary path; periodic; 
converging to a periodic path; chaotic, that is, without any structure; diverging (Weddepohl, 
1990). Also, Woodford, studying the complex dynamics of a macroeconomic model under the 
imperfect financial intermediation hypothesis, demonstrates the existence of many types of 
the system behaviour and the possibility for the equilibrium dynamics to be strongly chaotic. 
This might occur when some conditions are fulfilled (Woodford, 1989). Also, important results 
in the same way have been obtained by other authors (Brock and Hommes, 1995; Hommes 
and de Vilder, 1995; de Vilder, 1995). At the same time, but in parallel, a growing concern for 
the phenomenon of the hidden economy has increased attention among officials, politicians, 
and social scientists. As we showed, the methods adopted to estimate the size of 
underground economy can be grouped in two parts: direct approach (at microeconomic level) 
and indirect approach (at macroeconomic level); but there are still many controversies 
concerning the notion and sphere of comprising the underground economy (at present, there 
are over 100 names that are attributed to it, such as hidden, shadow, second, informal, etc.). 
Regarding the problem of underground (or parallel) economy in former communist countries, 
there are only few studies. One of the most useful works in this field is the Hénin's model, 
which offers a various menu of analysing the paths of emergence and development on 
underground side of Eastern economies (Hénin, 1986). There is extensive Western literature 
that deals with the fiscal policy impact on main macroeconomic indicators' changes or on 
individual agents' behaviour, but as a rule the underground sector is only implicit considered 
or it is ignored. Even in these conditions some recent studies demonstrate that chaotic 
regimes may occur from some threshold values of tax rate (Day, 1994). Also, the so-called 
"complexity" of tax rate system is questionable regarding the possibility of some unstable or 
even chaotic regimes' emergence. Some authors consider this complexity has an important 
impact on underground sector extension (Schneider et al., 1989; Lemieux et al., 1994). 
However, a remained major question is which is the mechanism of emergence and expanding 
the underground economy? Generally, the economic literature accepts that the rise of fiscal 
pressure leads to an erosion of the base of tax. This erosion is due to the limitation of the 
amount available for saving and investment and therefore for the income subject to tax in the 
next period. Therefore it will be necessary to consider a time lag and a discrete choice of 
economic modelling. But it is known that a discrete model of a logistic equation type (as the 
Laffer curve) leads, even in a single dimension space, to a chaotic behaviour for some values 
of an essential state-parameter. This opens the way for an approach under the terms of the 
general theory of discontinuities. Also, even within a continuous choice of economic 
modelling, the problem will be complicate by distribution of the taxpayers varying with level of 
income and wealth. Other complications emerge when a spatial distribution within a territory 
is considered. A map of this distribution, where the different points are in most of the cases 
placed on continuous curves and areas having smooth slopes, can be conceived. But on this 
map there will be also some critical points in the neighbourhood of which the system 
behaviour will register great and abrupt changes (jumps or falls) at slight deviations in value 
of some essential parameters (control parameters). In the "neighbourhood" zones the system 
behaviour and structure of the map are fundamentally different from the smooth zones. This 
type of approach corresponds to one of the catastrophe theory approach. Another 
interpretation of the tax base erosion is that it is caused by the migration of economic activity 
from the official sector to hidden economy sector, where the chaotic behaviour is supposed to 
prevail. When the regulations and fiscal pressure raise the share of underground sector 
increases, the "amount" of chaos of the entire economic system rises too. It is possible that at 
a certain level of this share, corresponding in its turn to a certain tax rate level (critical level A) 
an "explosion" of the system occurs, that is the entire economic system is subject to a chaos 
regime. The question is how large is this threshold level? On the other hand, when the fiscal 
pressure decrease the share of the underground sector decreases too, and the 
corresponding "amount" of chaos infused in the economic system by hidden economy 
declines; but in the official sector may occur a rising instability (as a rising budget deficit, due 
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 to the decrease of tax amount input). It is possible that this increasing instability to attract the 
official sector in a chaotic zone, and consequently the entire system enters a chaotic regime. 
In this case, the question arises: how low is this tax rate level (critical level B) beyond the 
systems explodes? A simplified model, as a Thom-type, a fold catastrophe with hysteresis 
effects, or a cusp catastrophe, can be imagined for representing this sort of an entire 
economic system evolution. Note that the two critical levels seem as two attractors, in their 
neighbourhood the system behaviour being fundamentally different from the one of stable 
zone. So, it is important to estimate the bounds of an assurance zone. Still note that the two 
types of chaos are fundamentally different. The first one (high level of tax rate) is due to the 
predominance of the "amount" of chaos from the underground sector, but the second one 
(low level of tax rate) is due to the predominance of the "amount" of chaos from the official 
sector, whose source is in an increasing instability in the regular sector. One of the recent 
developments of literature concerning the underground economy is the introduction of the 
term "complexity", but often in a standard economics context. It is used in two ways: as a 
general complexity of income tax (that is a complex or less visible income tax schedule) or as 
a complex income tax distribution according to criteria as age, sex, income level, wealth level, 
etc. For modelling, there is the problem of when its degree or level of other parameter may 
provoke the "explosion" of the initial model used and another must be the choice (also, it is 
possible that this situation occurs in reality). Another kind of complexity, important by the 
impact on the general plan of stabilization policy in the context of supply-side theory, is that 
relating to the methods of financing government budgetary deficit and government 
expenditure. Also, must note that the present day hard fiscal policy in Eastern European 
economies, which led to an explosive expansion of the underground sector, is probably due 
to the existence of an only incipient market of bonds. This situation practically restricts the 
financing of government deficit mainly by income taxation, in conditions of strong crises of 
investment and consequently of a weak economic efficiency. Concerning the time series 
obtained by using different methods for estimating the size of underground sector or generally 
those of tax rate registered, mention should be made that often there is large irregularity. 
Using a treatment in terms of fractal dimension methods may solve this situation at least 
partially. 
(8) To impute to Laffer curve model that it encourages to tolerate and to stimulate 
underground economy development is a wrong affirmation in our opinion. The mentioned 
conclusions may result from our limited possibilities to model, from the limits of our present 
science and our existing mathematical apparatus, from our own power of understanding the 
reality (the scientists from other disciplines as physics, for instance, had already the power to 
affirm frankly their own limits in investigating and understanding, but some economists have 
yet reticence to affirm this). Maybe, the main preoccupation of research would be to register 
the evident facts, even when they refuse to come into our present models. 
(9) On the other hand, the investigation of some economic time series or the constructing 
some models including until 4 or even 5 slow parameters, can be developed by using the 
recent results of Chaos Theory and its close Fractal Geometry and respectively Catastrophe 
Theory. But many times the explanations will be beyond those accepted by standard 
economic theory. Consequently, the partisans of classical economics mainstream will contest 
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6. QUANTITATIVE MODELS AND APPLICATIONS  
 
  In this chapter, we present main trends concerning underground economy modelling 
coming from the existing literature as well as some of our results, including applications to the 
Romania's economy in the transition period. 
      Our incursion in the specialized literature is from objective reasons very selectively. It 
focused on the main conclusions derived from quantitative approaches. Also, some of these 
resulting ideas will use as hypotheses in our in our following more or less quantitative models. 
Unfortunately, due mainly to the lack of some accurate large time series, the resulting 
estimations regarding the dimension and dynamics of underground economy in Romania are 
not very robust. Consequently, they must consider with prudence. The extension of time 
series to incorporate the period behind 1989 was not many times possibly by reason of 
incompatibility between the central-planned period and transition period.  
      A reasonable solution, to capture the degree of underground economy extension, 
may be to intersect the estimations coming from different models, as we some times 
proceeded. Other times, the models produced only simulation results, remaining for the future 
to apply them on empirical data. 
 
6.1 Models Based on Direct Approaches 
 
      Many  times,  the  estimations  of underground economy are directly obtained by 
extrapolation of data collected from a limited number of households by surveys and samples. 
However, in recent years, the modern theoretical models on tax evasion, which started with 
the work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and continued by Cowell (1990) and other studies 
already mentioned in previous chapter, there has been developed in a quantifying way. The 
support provides by some rigorous organized empirical studies. The main impediment in this 
case is the difficulty to collect information on number of hours worked by persons who illegally 
evade taxes, which makes it impossible to measure the effect of taxes on the allocation of 
time. To remedy these impediments, some studies analysed empirically labour-supply 
decisions in the underground economy using micro data from rigorous organized surveys 
such as that conducted in Quebec by Fortin and Frechette (1). 
      Coming from surveys they identified some key empirical regularities about the work in 
the untaxed sector and then they build adequate quantifying models. However, their survey 
seems to be less accurate for tax evaders operating at the margin of being detected. In this 
case data based on extensive audits (2) is more revealing for this tax evades (3). 
      The  main  conclusions  deduced  by  Lemieux, Fortin and Frechette from these 
empirical findings are the following three: 1 - labour earnings in the underground sector are 
concentrated among workers with low earnings in the regular sector, while expenditures on 
goods and services produced in the underground sector are typically undertaken by people 
with high earnings in the regular sector; 2 - the wage rate in the regular sector and the wage 
rate in the underground sector are positively correlated with hours worked in the regular 
sector but negatively correlated with hours worked in the underground sector; 3 - earnings in 
the regular sector are a linear or slightly convex function of regular-sector hours, while 
earnings in the underground sector are a concave function of underground-sector hours 
(Lemieux et al., 1994). 
      Then,  they  developed  a  model  based  on the idea that labour earnings in the 
underground sector are a concave function of hours of work, while in the regular sector labour 
earnings are a linear function of hours of work. The concavity of earnings' function in the 
underground sector implies that the marginal revenues of underground producers decrease 
as producers reach the limits of the informal markets in which they operate. By contrast, the 
wage rate of a worker in the regular sector does not vary with the number of hours worked 
(4). 
      The results of Lemieux, Fortin and Frechette's study suggest that hours worked in the 
underground sector are quite responsive to changes of the net wage in the regular sector. 
Most important, relating to our interest in this paper, their model also provides a natural link 
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 between the slope of the relationship between tax revenues and tax rates (the "Laffer curve") 
and a more conventional measure of the marginal excess burden of taxes due to the 
misallocation of productive resources from the regular to the underground sector (5). 
      The Lemieux's model is based on a concave Cobb-Douglas earnings function in the 
underground sector 
 
Y1 = A1 . h1θ                                                                  (6.1) 
 
where θ < 1, 
 
and on a linear earnings function in the regular sector 
 
Y0 = W0 . h0                                 (6.2) 
 
      The variable h0 represents hours of work in the regular sector; h1 represents hours of 
work in the underground sector; W0 is the wage in the regular sector; A1 is a revenue-shifter 
in the underground sector. 
      To simplify the representation, it considered the quasi-linear utility function: 
 
U ( l, C ) = γ . C + v ( l )                                                                            (6.3)  
 
where the function v ( . ) is a strictly concave utility function ( v' > 0, v" < 0 ). C represents a 
composite consumption good (the numeraire), while l is the number of hours of leisure that 
satisfies the time constraint 
 
T = h0 + h1 + l                                                                                   (6.4) 
 
      The budget constraint is given by 
 
C = I + W0 . h0 + A1 . h1θ                                                                    (6.5) 
 
where I represents non-labour income, including any lump-sum transfer.  
          In these conditions, the worker's problem is 
 
     max    [ γ . C + v . ( T - h0 - h1) ]                                                 (6.6) 
(C, h0, h1 )                                                            
 
subject to equation (6.5), h0 > 0, and h1> 0. For workers who supply positive hours in both 
sectors (interior solution), the first order conditions for hours yield: 
 
δU / δh0 = - v' . ( T - h0 - h1) = - γ . W0                                          (6.7) 
 
δU / δh1 = - v' . ( T - h0 - h1) = - γ . θ . A1 x h1θ - 1                                (6.8) 
 
      These two conditions imply the following equality for the marginal revenue of an hour 
of work in the two sectors: 
 
W0 = θ x A1 . h1θ - 1                                                              (6.9) 
 
      Hours of work in the underground sector are thus determined by setting the marginal 
revenue in the underground sector equal to the regular-sector wage. This is a very important 
result, which implies that, conditional on the regular-sector wage, underground-sector hours 
do not depend on preferences. 
      As  Lemieux  affirms,  this  "separation" between the determination of hours in the 
underground sector and preferences is similar to the separation result in the development 
literature on farm households that states that the labour demand of a farm is determined 
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 independently of the preferences of household members (6). This separation result has 
several implications that are consistent with the empirical regularities. The main considers the 
average wage rate in the underground sector: 
 
W1 = Y1 / h1 = A1 . h1θ - 1                                                              (6.10) 
 
      Equations (6.9) and (6.10) imply that W0 = θ . A1. Since θ  < 1, it follows that the 
regular-sector wage, W0, is smaller than the underground-sector wage W0. This prediction 
holds, on average, when the measure of W0 used is the regular wage net of the tax rate (7). 
This result will be also incorporated within the hypothesis of our global model used to 
evaluate the dimension of underground economy in Romania. 
      Following the basic model of tax evasion and considering that net earnings in regular 
sector, WN0, are given by  
 
WN0 = ( 1 - t ) . W0 . h0                                                           (6.11) 
 
where t is flat tax rate, Lemieux postulates that workers who supply positive hours to the 
underground sector face a probability P of being detected by authorities. Becoming caught 
entails a penalty proportional to the amount of tax evaded (8). The penalty rate (tp) on 
underground income can write as: 
 
tp = n . t                                                                                      (6.12) 
 
n being the penalty rate on evaded tax ( n > 1 ). The expected rate of tax penalty on evaded 
income is thus given by  P . n . t. 
      Again, in case of this model of tax evasion the result was that underground-sector 
hours do not depend on preferences conditional on W0 and t. This is because of fact that the 
utility function is linear in consumption, which implies risk-neutrality in consumption. The case 
in which workers are risk-averse but face a parametric wage in both the regular and the 
underground sector has been analysed by several authors (Sandmo, 1981; Cowell, 1985; 
Fluet, 1987). This case leads to few interesting comparative-static results, however, even with 
strong restrictions on preferences for consumption and leisure. As noted by Cowell (1984), 
the basic reason for these ambiguities is that "in reaction to any perturbation, the individual 
can substitute across two margins (risk/no-risk and labour/leisure), so that in principle all sorts 
of behaviour could be consistent with rational expected utility maximization" (9). One main 
result of the Lemieux's model developed in this way is that an increase in tax rate has a 
positive effect on hours of work in the underground sector, but a negative effect on hours of 
work in the regular sector. 
      To analyse the implications of tax policy, Lemieux considered an experiment in which 
total hours worked in the two sectors does not depend on the marginal tax rate. In response 
to a change in the tax rate, people therefore reallocate a given hour of work from the regular 
to the underground sector, so that: 
 
dh0 / dt = - dh1 / dt                                                                        (6.13) 
 
          The excess burden (EB) caused by the misallocation of hours between the two 
sectors is given by: 
 
EB = W0 . [ h1 ( t ) - h1 ( 0 ) ] - A1 . { [ h1 ( t ) ]θ  - [ h1 ( 0 ) ]θ  }            (6.14) 
 
where h1 ( t ) and h1 ( 0 ) are the hours worked in the underground sector with and without a 
tax rate t respectively. The marginal excess burden (MEB) measures how much the excess 
burden has to increase in order to raise an additional currency unit (dollar) of taxes: 
 
MEB = δEB / δT = ( δEB / dt ) x ( δt / δT ) =  
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         = [ W0 - θ . A1 . h1θ - 1 ] . ( dh1 / dt ) . ( δt / δT )                   (6.15) 
 
where T represents total tax revenues (T = t . W0 . h0) and δT/δt is the slope of the Laffer 
curve. This slope depends on how hours of work respond to a change in the tax rate. 
      After some transformations, and supposing 
 
θ . A1 . h1θ - 1  = ( 1 - t ) . W0                                                        (6.16) 
 
MEB can be written as: 
 
MEB = t . W0 . ( dh1 / dt ) . ( δt / δT ) = ( 1 - η ) / η                          (6.17) 
 
where η represents the elasticity of the Laffer curve or δln ( T ) / δln ( t ). 
      Some results of application of the model on empirical data collected in Quebec City, 
Canada, by samples reported by the Lemieux's study are:   
    - the estimate value of θ is 0.67; 
    - since both η and MEB depend on the ratio of underground to regular income Y1/Y0 
and on the marginal tax rate t, their respective values vary considerably across the different 
groups of the population; 
    - the estimates of the elasticity of the Laffer curve (η) range from 0.407 for workers 
who received some welfare payments during the year to 0.994 for workers aged 40 and more; 
      - these two extreme values of η yield values of the marginal excess burden in 
production (MEB) of 1.457 and 0.006, respectively; 
    - on average, an increase in the tax rate does not substantially distort labour-market 
activities from the regular sector to the underground sector; 
      - on the other hand, the same increase in the tax rate, or in the tax-back rate 
embodied in social-welfare programs, has a very substantial effect on the allocation of time of 
social-welfare claimants. 
      These  conclusions  only  hold,  however, when the probabilities of detection by the 
authorities and penalty rate are negligible (P . n = 0). Although this might be true for some 
underground activities, the results of Lemieux's study suggest that is not true in general. 
Government enforcement policies might thus be offsetting some of the distortion due to the 
presence of the tax and transfer system (Lemieux et al., 1994). 
      Other model, calibrated to replicate the observed labour supply in a random sample 
conducted in the metropolitan area of Quebec City for 1985, is that of Fortin and Lacroix 
(1994). So, they used a simultaneous model of labour supply in the regular and irregular 
sectors that facilitated to compute the marginal cost of public funds associated with tax and 
enforcement instruments. 
      Also, there are some other interesting quantitative models in the existing literature 
which treat the behaviour of households relaying to the work in underground sector and that 
are based on micro-data samples, especially in case of Northern European countries 
(Isachsen and Strom, 1981 and 1985), but they being over the goal of our study that focuses 
on the macro-data approach of the underground sector. 
 
6.2 Models Based on Monetary Approach 
 
      On the rule, there are two categories of models, function of the methods of approach: 
the transaction approach and the currency demand approach respectively. 
      The first category of models, developed firstly by Feige (1979), comes from Fisher's 
quantity equation: 
 
M / v = p / Tr                                                                                 (6.18) 
 
where M represents money; v - velocity; p - prices; Tr - total transactions. 
          This approach assumes that there is a constant relation over time between the 
volume of transaction and official GDP. Assumptions have to be made about the velocity of 
money and about the relationship between the value of total transactions (p/Tr) and nominal 
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 GDP. Relating total nominal GDP to total transactions, GDP in the shadow economy can be 
derived by subtracting the official GDP from total nominal GDP. To derive figures for the 
shadow economy, Feige has had to assume a base year in which there is no shadow 
economy, and therefore the ratio of p/Tr to total nominal (official = total) GDP was "normal" 
and would have been constant over time if there were no underground economy. This method 
too has several weaknesses: for instance, the assumption of a base year with no shadow 
economy, and the assumption of a "normal" ratio of transactions, constant over time. 
Moreover, to obtain reliable estimates, precise figures for the total volume of transactions 
should be available. This availability might be especially difficult to achieve for cash 
transactions, because they depend, among other factors, on the quality of paper used in the 
currency. Generally, although this approach is theoretically attractive, the empirical 
requirements, necessary to obtain reliable estimates, are so difficult to fulfil, that its 
application may lead to doubtful results. 
      The second category of models based on currency demand approach was developed 
firstly by Cagan (1958) and Gutmann (1977). Then, important contributions based on 
econometric applications had done by Klovland (1980,1984), Tanzi (1982) and Isachsen and 
Strom (1985). 
      In the Klovland's approach, for instance, to model behaviour of economic system the 
following variables are needed: C = currency held by the public; P = price index; Y = real 
GDP; i = rate of return on time deposits; π = rate of inflation; c = private consumption as a 
share of GDP; t = total taxes as a share of GDP; θ = stock adjustment parameter (0 < θ < 1). 
    Klovland specified his model by the following two relations: 
 
lnC - lnC-1 = θ . ( lnC* - lnC-1 )                                                         (6.19) 
 
ln ( C* / P ) = α0 + α1  . lnY + α2 . i + α3  . π + α4  . c + α5  . t                       (6.20) 
                               +              -           -            +           + 
 
where C* is the long run demand for currency and α0, ..., α0  are coefficients. 
          The signs below the last equation give the expected signs of the coefficients. 
Isachsen and Strom (1985) used this model to estimate the size of underground economy in 
Norway. Annual data were used, covering the period 1952-78. 
      The estimation gave result for ln(C/P). All the estimated coefficients, except for the 
coefficient attached to the inflation rate, have the expected signs. Then, to proceed with the 
estimation of the size of the underground economy they rewrite (6.20) as 
 
lnC = lnP + Zα* + α5*t                                                                           (6.21) 
 
where the term Zα* includes the α's variables except for the tax rate. α* and α5* are 
estimated values. Then predicted currency holdings at time t is 
 
Cτ * = exp( lnPτ  + Zτα* + α5 *tτ  )                                                    (6.22) 
 
      In order to obtain an estimate of the size of the underground economy they selected 
1952 as a base year. Thus, if the tax rate had remained at the 1952 level, the predicted value 
of currency holdings would have been 
 
C52,α* = exp( lnPτ  + Zτα* + α5*t52 )                                            (6.23) 
 
The difference, ∆Cτ  = Cτ* - C52,τ*, would then give the increase in the amount of currency 
needed to fuel the tax evasion part of the economy compared to the currency needs if tax 
rates had remained at the 1952 levels. They next assume that no tax evasion took place in 
the base year or in years before that. In these conditions, ∆Cτ would yield an estimate of all 
currency circulating in the underground economy at time τ. Then, according to Tanzi (1980) 
and others they assume that the income velocity of currency in the underground economy 
equals the velocity of M1 money in the official parts of the economy. Under a such 
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 hypothesis, for each year of the analysed period the velocity rate, Vτ, and respectively the 
GDP contribution from the underground economy, yuτ, is given by the following relations: 
 
Vτ  = Yτ  / ( M1τ - ∆Cτ )                                                                           (6.24) 
 
yuτ  = (  Yuτ / Yτ  ) = ∆Cτ / ( M1τ - ∆Cτ )                                         (6.25) 
 
where Yuτ  ( Yuτ = Vτ x ∆Cτ )  and Yt  are the GDP in underground sector and respectively the 
official GDP. 
      Using this model, Isachsen and Strom obtained the following values of the share of 
underground economy in Norway: 1.3% in 1971; 0.6% in 1973; 4.3% in 1976; 6.3% in 1978. 
Also, Klovland (1980) employed a narrow definition of the money stock and arrived at a 
higher velocity for the year 1978, that is 6.7. As part of observed GDP, the underground 
economy then becomes 9.2%.  
  The first objection relates to the fact that not all transactions in the underground 
economy are paid in cash. Also, Isachsen and Strom (1981) used the survey method to 
discover that in Norway in 1980 roughly 80% of all transactions in the underground sector 
were paid in cash. The size of the total underground economy (including barter) may thus be 
even larger than previously estimated. Most studies consider only one particular factor, the 
tax burden, as a cause of the underground economy. Other reasons such as the impact of 
regulation, the complexity or visibility of the tax system, taxpayers' attitudes to the state, "tax 
morality", and so on are not considered because data for most countries is not available. If, as 
seems likely, these other factors also have an impact on the extent of the underground 
economy, it might be larger than reported in most studies (10). 
      A further weakness of this approach, at least when applied to the United States by 
Tanzi (1980, 1983), is discussed by Garcia (1979) and Park (1979). They point out that 
increases in currency demand deposits are due largely to a slow-down in demand deposits 
rather than to an increase in currency caused by activity in the underground economy. Blades 
criticizes Tanzi's studies because the US-Dollar it is used as an international currency, so that 
Tanzi should have considered (and compensated for) the amount of US-Dollars held in cash 
abroad. Finally, Frey and Pommerehne (1984) claim that Tanzi's parameter estimates are not 
very stable (11). 
      Another weak point of this approach, as applied in most studies, is the assumption 
that the velocity in both types of economy is the same. As Klovland (1984) argues for the 
Scandinavian countries, there is already considerable uncertainty about the velocity of 
circulation of currency in the official economy; the velocity of currency in the underground 
sector is even more difficult to estimate. Without knowledge about the velocity of currency in 
the underground economy, one has to accept the assumption of an "equal" velocity of money 
in both sectors. Finally, the assumption of no underground economy in a base year is open to 
criticism. Relaxing this assumption would again imply an upward adjustment of the figures 
attained in the bulk of the studies already undertaken. 
      We  also  applied  this  model  in  the case of Romania's economy. Unfortunately, 
because of lack of comparable data concerning the tax rate for to create large time series, the 
results obtained were ambiguously. In these conditions we are forced to replace tax rate by 
final government consumption rate. In this case, the estimated size of underground economy 
is among 1.5% in 1989 and 4.8% in 1994 (Annex 6.1). We consider again these figures as 
representing only a fraction of the marketable part of the national economy (12). 
 
6.3 Fiscal Pressure and Penalty Models 
 
  In this category we included models that take into account the impact of penalty tax. 
This type of tax applied when the fiscal authorities register a subtraction from tax pay duties 
or an illegality. It is on rule greater than normal tax rate but smaller than value 1 (case that 
corresponds to confiscation of the entire registered income that did not declared to the fiscal 
authorities). 
      To capture the impact of penalty tax rate on the yearly average tax rate we develop 
the Laffer's curve model in the following way. Therefore, we consider two conventional stages 
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 of tax process gathering. Firstly, the normal paid taxes gather from taxpayers. To express the 
total amount of income taxes received by fiscal authorities in this stage we recall the simple 
expression of Laffer's curve model: 
 
Tn = tn . Yn = tn . ( Y - Yh ) = tn . ( 1 - tn )                                           (6.26) 
 
where Tn is the total amount of taxes received by normal procedures; tn - average normal tax 
rate; Yh  -  hidden GDP at the end of normal tax procedures; Y - total GDP (including Yn and 
Yh). 
          In the second stage the fiscal authorities register a part of hidden activity, which 
became visible, and by applying penalty procedures they gather: 
 
Tp = tp . Yp = tp . ( Yh - Yi ) = tp . Yh . ( 1 - tp )                                     (6.27) 
 
where Tp is the total income from penalty procedures; tp - average penalty tax rate (1>tp>tn); 
Yi - invisible GDP (remaining hidden after the application of penalty procedures).  
      Unifying the two types of taxes we can write: 
 
T = tm . Yv = tn . Y . ( 1 - tn ) + tp . Yh . ( 1 - tp )                                 (6.28) 
 
where T is the total yearly amount of paid and received taxes; tm - the resulting average tax 
rate calculated at the end of year; Yv - the visible GDP registered at the level of year. 
  Similar to generalized Laffer's curve model we considered the following two 
hypotheses: 
 




Yi = Yh . tp                                                                                              (6.30) 
 
They suppose that in both stages of gathering of taxes the proportion of hidden GDP equals 
to the respective applied tax level. 
      After  some  algebraic  operations,  we  can write the yearly average tax rate as 
following: 
 
tm = [ T / ( Yn + Yp ) ] = tn . [ ( 1 - tn ) + tp . ( 1 - tp ) ] / [ ( 1 - tn ) + tn . ( 1 - tp ) ]   (6.31) 
 
      Supposing tm as a given parameter, the relation between normal tax and penalty tax 
will be: 
 
- tn2 + tn . [ 1 + tp . ( 1 + tm ) - tp2 ] - tm = 0                                                (6.32) 
 
under the condition: 
 
Dn = [ 1 + tp . ( 1 + tm ) - tp2 ] - 4 . tm > 0                                                      (6.33) 
 
      The equation (6.32) can also write as: 
 
- tn . tp2 + tn . ( 1 + tm ) . tp + tn . ( 1 - tn ) - tm = 0                               (6.34) 
 
with the condition: 
 




0 < tn < tm < tp < 1                                                                              (6.36) 
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      The model permits to compute different alternatives of fiscal policy, when the accent 
moves from the instrument of normal tax policy to the instrument of penalty tax and their 
limits. Some simulation results present in Annex 6.2. 
      Other model to optimising the productivity of fiscal penalty activity, which correlated 
with the first model, should permit to choose the best policy from a set of possible fiscal policy 
alternatives. It can conceive, by supposing the registered GDP by penalty procedures (Yp), 
as being a concave function of the expenditure for fiscal penalty procedures. Therefore, we 
choose the following logistical type function: 
 
Yp = Yh . [ ( 1 - e- a . j ) / ( 1 + e- a . j )]                                                   (6.37) 
 
where e is the natural logarithmic base; j - the necessary expenditure to apply penalty 
procedures; a  -  coefficient (which may be estimated econometrically). 
      In this case, the expression of total amount of taxes from penalty procedures can 
write as: 
 
Tp = tn . Y . tp . [ ( 1 - e- a . j ) / ( 1 + e- a . j ) ]                                           (6.38) 
 
A promising forthcoming path is to develop the model on an econometric base (13). In this 
paper we present in Annex 6.3 only a simulation result. 
 
6.4 A Global Model Based on Labour Supply Method 
 
  Firstly, we consider a national economy having only two sectors: visible (or official) 
sector and invisible (or underground) sector. In case of visible sector the registered GDP 
supposes as having the following components: 
 
Yv = A + Sv + Bv                                                                                         (6.39) 
 
where Yv is the GDP produced in the visible sector; A - consumption of fixed capital (only in 
visible sector); Sv - wages of employees in visible sector; Bv - profit of entrepreneurs 
(capitalists) in the visible sector. In the invisible sector the produced GDP will be: 
 
Ya = Sa + Ba                                                                                          (6.40) 
 
where Ya is the GDP produced in the underground sector; Sa - wages of employees in the 
invisible sector; Ba - profit of entrepreneurs (capitalists) in the invisible sector. In case of 
invisible sector it supposes that there is only circulating capital. 
      Also, we consider that both the available time fund and total number of labour force 
distribute between two components, as following: 
 
F = Fv + Fa                                                                                          (6.41) 
 
L = Lv + La                                                                                                 (6.42) 
 
where F is the total available time fund for work within a calendar year; L - number of total 
potential working persons; Fv - time used for work in the visible sector by year; Fa - potential 
available time used by the persons having status of employees in visible sector for work as a 
double job in underground sector; Lv - number of employees working in visible sector; La - 
potential number of employees working in underground sector. 
      We mention that the available working time evaluates as average number of hours' 
values by a calendar year. For instance, they may consider as average number of hours 
worked by a person within a calendar year. 
          Now, we express the GDP created in the two sectors of a national economy as 
functions of productivity, which consider here as linear functions: 
 
Yv = Lv . Fv . wv                                                                                  (6.43) 
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Ya = ( La . F + Lv . Fa ) . wa                                                            (6.44) 
 
where wv and wa are the average productivity by person by hour in visible sector and 
respectively in invisible sector. 
          To obtain the total number of hours worked by year in underground sector, we 
considered two categories. One of this encloses persons that work full-time in the 
underground sector (persons having status of non-employees in the visible sector) (La . F). 
The other come from the persons having the status of employees in visible sector, but 
working also in underground sector during the supplementary work time as a second job (Lv . 
Fa). 
       What is interesting for the agents or people are the level of disposable income or 
available GDP. In the two sectors of the economy the available income or GDP will give by 
the following relations: 
 




Yda = Ya                                                                                      (6.46) 
 
which can be also written under the following forms: 
 
Ydv = Lv . Fv . wv . ( 1 - t )                                                                       (6.47) 
 
Yda = ( Lv . Fa + La . F ) . wa                                                                      (6.48) 
 
where Ydv, Yda represent the available income in visible sector and respectively in invisible 
sector; T is the total amount of taxes paid (or of obligatory levying); t - average tax rate 
relatively to Yv. 
    Taking into account the structural relations (6.41 and 6.42) we can write now the 
expression of the total available income as following: 
 




Yd = ( L - La ) . ( F - Fa ) . wv . ( 1 - t ) + [ ( L - La ) . Fa + La . F ] . wa         
 (6.50) 
 
          The first relation permits to analyse the impact of number of persons working in 
visible sector (Lv) and of their corresponding number of hours worked in this sector (Fv) on 
the total available income at national level. The second makes the same but concerning the 
number of persons working in invisible sector (La) and respectively the number of hours 
worked in invisible sector by persons having the status of employees in visible sector (Fa). 
We remember that in case of persons actually having the status of non-employees in visible 
sector (but having a potential to work by age and disposable free time criteria) it supposed 
that they allocate their entire available working time to work in the invisible sector (F). In the 
same time, the persons actually having the status of employees in visible sector are forced to 
divide the same entire disposable working time (F) between work in the visible sector (Fv) 
and work in invisible sector (Fa). 
      Maybe this total available income, greater than available income in visible sector, is 
responsible of some unexplainable macroeconomic non-correlation registered between some 
"official" indicators. 
      Now, we define the yearly national potential by the following relation: 
 
P = F . L . wv                                                                                    (6.51) 
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 where P is the maximum level of GDP by year. 
          Due to the productivity in the invisible sector is on rule supposed weakly than 
productivity in the visible sector it results the following non-equality: 
 
Yv + Ya < P                                                                                       (6.52) 
 
      Now, we can express the actual total available income by year as: 
 
Yd = P . [ m + lv . fv . ( 1 - t - m ) ]                                                       (6.53) 
 
where m is the ratio between the productivity in invisible sector and productivity in visible 
sector (wa/wv); lv - the share of employees in visible sector in the total number of potential 
working persons (Lv/L); fv - the share of time used to work in the visible sector in total 
available working time within a calendar year (Fv/F). On the other hand, if the entire activity 
would allocate in the visible sector the maximum level of available GDP would be: 
 
Yd* = P . ( 1 - t )                                                                                (6.54) 
 
Now, we suppose that the people chose the actual situation that is the actual distribution of 
the total capacity to work between sectors. This produces an available income greater than or 
at least equal to that would be produced by the above hypothetical case. Therefore, there will 
be the following restriction: 
 
Yd > Yd*                                                                                                    (6.55) 
 
After some technical algebraic operations, it obtains the following equivalent restrictions: 
 
m > 1 - t                                                                                                        (6.56) 
 
wa > wv . ( 1 - t )                                                                                (6.57) 
 
      We must now mention that our present model conceives as a simulation model in the 
goal to determine the variance interval thresholds of underground sector coming from the 
existing statistical data at macroeconomic level. In this case we considered the absolute 
values both for the total potential number of working persons (L) and for total number of 
potential working hours during a calendar year (F). This could seem a few graters 
exaggerated comparing with the real values registered in case of visible sector (Lv and Fv). 
       So, in case of invisible sector, we consider that the resulting levels of some indicators 
- productivity, profit rate - are smaller than in the real situation. We consider that this 
diminution must consider in the following way. It is because aside of the comprehension to 
obtain available income for instance in our model there is an implicit manner included the 
comprehension to leisure of the people having an available labour force. For instance, the 
actual available income computed by our simulation model is greater than the level that would 
obtain in the case of a full-time work in the visible sector (Yd > Yd*). The difference must 
consider as implicitly including the satisfaction of leisure comprehension problem. 
      Now,  we  consider  importantly  evaluating the variation interval of the underground 
sector dimension. In this way, we write the share of invisible sector in the national economy 
as: 
 
ya (wa) = Ya (wa) / Y (wa)                                                                   (6.58) 
 
where Ya (wa) is given in relation (6.44) and Y is the total yearly GDP: 
 
Y (wa) = Yv + Ya (wa)                                                                                   (6.59) 
 
For the productivity in the invisible sector we chose the following extreme values: 
 
wamin = ( 1 - t ) . wv                                                                                   (6.60) 
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wamax = wv                                                                                     (6.61) 
 
to which correspond the following extreme values of the share of invisible sector in national 
economy: 
 
yamin = 1 - { ( lv . fv ) / [ 1 - t . ( 1 - lv . fv ) ] }                                       (6.62) 
 
yamax = 1 - lv . fv                                                                                     (6.63) 
 
Within this interval we shall analyse the diverse alternatives regarding the average wages and 
profits in the underground sector relating to the situation registered in the visible sector. 
      In case of visible sector, to evaluate the average wage and the average rate of profit, 
we considered the following relations: 
 
sv = [ Sv / ( Lv . Fv ) ] = [ Yv - ( T + Bv + A ) ] / ( Lv . Fv )                     (6.64) 
 
bv = [ Bv / ( T + A + Sv ) ] = [ Yv - ( T + Sv + A ) ] / ( T + A + Sv )           (6.65) 
 
where sv is the average wage by person by hour of work in visible sector; bv - the average 
profit rate in visible sector; Sv - total amount of the yearly salaries in visible sector; Bv - total 
amount of the yearly profits in visible sector. 
      On the other hand, in invisible sector the corresponding relations are: 
 
sa = [ Sa / ( La . F + Lv . Fa ) ] = ( Ya - Ba ) / ( La . F + Lv . Fa )         (6.66) 
 
ba = [ Ba / Sa ] = ( Ya - Sa ) / Sa = ( wa - sa ) / sa                        (6.67) 
 
where sa is the average wage by person by hour of work in invisible sector; ba - the average 
profit rate in invisible sector; Sa - total amount of the yearly salaries in invisible sector; Ba - 
total amount of the yearly profits in invisible sector. 
      In case of the following applications we replaced the consumption of fixed capital (A) 
by investment. Moreover the average wage in the invisible sector considered comprised 
between the values 0.5 and 2 relating to the average wage in the visible sector of the national 
economy. The detailed tables and calculus find in Annexes 6.4. Here we present only some 
conclusions resulting from the model's application in case of Romania's economy. 
      For the each year of the period 1989-1993 the number of employees in the visible 
sector (Yv) is that from the available official statistical publications. To evaluate the yearly 
time of work in visible sector for each year we firstly diminished the number of days of year by 
weekend days and vacancies. Then we multiply the result with legal time working per day (8 
hours) and then by an average coefficient that designs the average using degree of the total 
legal working time. 
      For both total potential numbers of employees (L) and total number of hours by year 
by person (F) we considered three versions that designed by maximum (I), intermediary (II), 
and minimum (III). Also, in case of the maximal version, L includes the employees in the 
visible sector (Lv), official unemployed, school population of age over 15 years, and retired 
population of age under 70 years. In case of intermediary version, it added to Lv the same 
number as in precedent case, but divided by two. In case of minimal version, it added to Lv 
only a half of unemployment number. 
      In case of F, the maximal version obtained by multiplying the calendar year number of 
days with eight (representing hours of work by day). To determine the intermediate value of F, 
we added 52 (representing the number of Saturdays by year) to the average number of days 
worked per year by a person in the visible sector (Fv). Moreover, we added a half of number 
of days used for vacancies in visible sector. Then we multiply the result with eight (number of 
hours worked by day). In case of minimal version we chose the same number of days worked 
in visible sector but multiplied only with eight hours per day.  
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       In case of each variant (I, II, and III), we calculated the two threshold values - minim 
and maxim - of underground economy by using formulas (6.62 and 6.63). Also, within this 
interval, we separated a sub-interval. This covers, on the one hand, the intersection between 
the curve of salary in underground sector and the value of salary in official sector (inferior 
limit). On the other hand, it covers the intersection between the curve of profit rate in 
underground sector and the value of profit rate in official sector (superior limit). This sub-
interval represents, when it adopted one of the three variants for analysing, the set enclosing 
the most probably values of underground economy share. A synthetic presentation of 
simulation results there is in Table 6.1. Also, in Figure 6.1, we show the dynamics of 
underground economy in Romania in the period 1989-1993, according to the three variants. 
      Variant I, derived from the theoretical limits of the productive national potential, can 
suggest the maxim values to which the underground sector should extend. It is useful for long 
run forecasts. The versions II and III seem to produce estimates that are nearly of the figures 
commonly used in literature for to appoint the size of underground economy. One of the most 
difficult problems remains the separation between the preference of people to use their 
available time for work in underground economy and that to use the available time for leisure. 
In any case, the variant I can produce a satisfactory estimation for the total available time 
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                                                           Figure 6.1 
 
 
6.5 A Generalized Model for the Allocation of Time 
 
      Now, we recall the two hypotheses of the model for the time allocation, relations (6.1) 
and (6.2). Also, we present in Figure 6.2 a graphical representation of this model.  
      The main implication of this model, also largely used in literature, is that in point M of 
graphic the average salary in underground sector equals to that in visible sector. This, 
translated in terms of our model, can be expressed by following relations: 
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SaM = A1 . hvθ  = SvM = sv . hv                                                    (6.68) 
 
On the graphic, also one may observe that the difference between Sa and Sv is maximal only 
in one point of abscise noted ha*, which represents the optimal number of hours worked in 
underground sector.  
      To evaluate this optimal level of underground work, we write the function, which must 
be maximized as: 
 
G ( ha ) = A1 . haθ  - sv . ha                                                                           (6.69) 
 
and the first-order derivative as: 
 
G' ( ha ) = θ . A1 .  haθ -1 - sv                                                                      (6.70) 
 
However, at the national level, the function that concerns is: 
 
H ( ha ) = S - S* =  ( A1 . haθ  + sv . ha ) - sv . ( hv + ha )                             (6.71) 
 
Here, we can observe the equality between H and G. So, the two functions have the same 
solution for maxim. 
      After some algebraic operations, we obtained the following remarkable value for ha: 
 
h* = hv . θ[ 1 / ( 1 - θ ) ]                                                                              (6.72) 
 
that then we permitted to express the optimal proportion of underground economy within the 
national economy by the following relation: 
 
( h* / h ) = { θ[ 1 / ( 1 - θ ) ] } / { 1 + θ[ 1 / ( 1 - θ ) ] }                                                (6.73) 
 
where, h is total number of hours worked in a country in a year. 
     On base of this relation we calculated the share of underground economy for various 
values of parameter θ (see Annex 6.5). An interesting result is that, at limit, the maximal share 
of underground economy (in shown optimal conditions) is only about 26.9% (i.e. 1/(1+e)). 
      Developing this model, we can obtain the map of the entire process of allocation of 
time, as it is shown in Figure 6.2. Also, here is represented the migration of some cohorts 
from the so-called "army of reserve" (leisure time) to the underground sector. For instance, 
this may be provoked by an increase in number of hours worked in visible sector, which will 
move at a higher level the curve of wage in underground sector. This will make more 
attractive work in underground activity and it may lead to a re-allocation of available time of 
households. In these terms it may be considered the potential labour force and the maximal 
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(1) See Fortin and Frechette (1987) for a full description of the data set (Fortin and Frechette, 
1986). Related surveys that did in Europe reported in Pestieau (1985) and Ginsburg et al. 
(1987) for Norway; and Van Eck and Kazemir (1988) for Netherlands. 
(2) Most empirical studies in North America based on data from the Compliance 
Measurement Program (Witte and Woodbury, 1985; Feinstein, 1991; Smith, 1985; Portes et 
al., 1989). 
(3) The two measurement approaches, micro surveys and tax audits, should thus be viewed 
as complementing each other. 
(4) A similar approach it used by Gronau (1977) to explain the allocation time among home 
production, market work, and leisure. He postulates that the value of home production is a 
concave function of hours worked at home, which explains why hours worked at home are 
negatively related to the market wage, just as hours in the underground sector are negatively 
related to the regular-sector wage in the Lemieux's article. One explanation for the concavity 
of the earnings' function in the underground sector is based on the principle that the informal 
nature of economic activities in that sector imposes a limit on the scope of these activities. 
Because of these market limitations, the underground-sector workers face a downward-
sloping demand for his output. As hours of work and output expand, the output price goes 
down, which tends to reduce the value of the marginal product of labour when there are 
constant (or decreasing) returns to scale in production. Labor earnings in the underground 
sector are thus typically a concave function of hours worked in that sector (Lemieux et al., 
1994). 
  63 
 (5) An interesting review of the debates surrounding the Laffer curve there is in Fullerton 
(1982). 
(6) In specialized literature, it is typically assumed that farmers face the choice between 
cultivating their land according to a concave production function or working in the market at a 
given wage rate that does not depend on hours of work (Rosenzweig, 1980; Benjamin, 1992). 
(7) These results, obtained by Lemieux et al., based on 93 valid observations in regular and 
underground sector. The net wage is the regular wage net of an imputed marginal tax rate 
that takes account of income taxes, payroll taxes, and tax-back rates (embodied in the social 
transfer system). 
(8) This formulation was first proposed by Yitzhaki (1974). 
(9) However, Fluet (1987) has shown that, under the assumption that W0 < W1, there 
necessarily exists a positive relationship between the tax rate and labour supply in the 
underground sector. Fluet assumes that the degree of absolute risk aversion is decreasing in 
consumption and that there is an interior solution for h0 and h1. 
(10) One justification for the use of the tax variable only is that this variable has by far the 
strongest impact on the size of the underground economy in all studies known by us. An 
exception is the study by Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984), where the variable "tax 
immorality" has a quantitatively larger and statistically higher influence in the model than the 
direct tax share. In a study on the U.S. underground economy, Pommerehne and Schneider 
(1985) showed that the tax variable has a dominating influence and contributes roughly 70-
78% to the size of the underground economy. 
(11) In studies for European countries, Kirchgassner (1983) and Schneider (1986) reach the 
conclusion that the estimation results for Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are quite 
robust when using this approach.  
(12) Moreover, in first years of transition, at least in Romania's economy there was a 
"dollarization" phenomenon that evades from official statistics. Some estimations show that 
the stock of foreign currency held by population is over one thousand million dollars, many 
transactions being made directly in dollars or other foreign currency (Dobrescu, 1994). 
(13) An interesting forthcoming way may be to investigate the conditions when the fiscal 
policies enter chaotic regimes. It seems that we already found a possible similarity between 
the so-called Henon's model and the penalty model. So, a preliminary canonical form of this 
correspondence should write as following: ti/(A . tni) = 1 - n2 . ( ti -1)2 + ( n - 1 ) . ti -2,  where A 
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7. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
    The transition towards a free market economic system in Central and East-European 
countries is doubled (followed) by a profound economic crisis. Generally, in these countries 
the production in the official sector has been decreased rapidly after 1989 and official 
unemployment grew up to levels even greater than those currently registered in Western 
countries. Also, the income from the work in official sector decreased dramatically during a 
historically short period. In these conditions, an increasing share of labour force supply moves 
to the black labour market. Contrary to the hypothesis of greater wages in underground sector 
than those in official sector, many suppliers of labour force on black market accept wages 
smaller than in the official sector case (sa < sv). 
      On the other hand, the profit rate in the underground sector is always greater than the 
net profit rate in the visible sector (ba > bv). This is at least due to the two reasons: 
       - in the underground sector there is no payment as taxes or other social duties; 
     - the expenditures for investments in fixed capital in underground sector are minimally 
(nearly zero) (they used exclusively only circulating capital and they operate under the rule of 
the profit maximization in the short run, which, within a situation as how is at present in the 
transition period, of penury of capital funds, doubled by an increasing inflation and a 
depreciation of national currency, is accentuated. 
      In the transition period, there is a relative penury of consumption goods and services 
yet and the production of heavy industries and generally of capital goods remains again 
monopoly of the state enterprises. Consequently, in the underground sector, comparing with 
visible sector, the smaller amounts of disposable capital from small entrepreneurs go mainly 
to the production of consumption goods and services, where there is an uncovered demand 
for employment, the initial necessary amount of capital is smaller being exclusively destined 
to assure circulating capital funds, the velocity of expended monetary funds and rate of return 
to capital are greater. 
          Moreover, in the first years of transition when the inflation rate was greater than 
interest rate (namely a negative interest rate in real terms) and the former fiscal legislation 
collapsed there was a massive migration from visible sector to underground activities. 
          Also, in conditions of an average small income per household, a supplementary 
supply of labour comes from some categories of population traditionally non-included in the 
labour force (such as: pupils, students, retired persons, and domestic women) and from 
official unemployed. 
      In  transition  period  has  been  developed some new differences among groups of 
population: one is that between employed people and unemployed people, other is that 
between people employed only in official sector and those employed in underground sector or 
in both sectors. In conditions of a deepen crisis of production in the visible sector, the winners 
will be those employed in underground sector (including persons employed in both sectors). 
In a first stage, the disposable income providing from such differences will be accumulated 
and then oriented (by reasons of efficiency) to underground activities. But in a second stage, 
when the amount of capital accumulated became greater than the power of absorption of 
unofficial sector, there will be an inverse tendency: the new riches people coming from 
underground activities will desire to make official their new status and consequently they will 
try to "whiten" their money and then to become "respectable" people, to enter into the legal 
activities. This last phase we may consider it as the end of a cyclical sequence and the entire 
movement as a wave. After the stage of "primitive accumulation of capital" the Eastern 
economies will register a similar evolution as Western economies. On the general 
background of the restraint of share of the underground economy, it will be registered some 
fundamental restructurings within the invisible sector. The share of more sophisticate 
underground activities will increase comparing with the share of rudimentary and artisan 
underground activities. 
      Since it will be possibly to enter a new-spiralled cycle, it remains a question for the 
future time. Therefore, we consider that the description of the general process of economic 
development in long run based on a model of endogenous cycle, which explain the general 
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 economic fluctuations by a set of successive waves or overlapping cyclical phases relating to 
the report between underground economy and visible economy, may be as a plausible 
alternative to the standard models based only the dynamics of the official sector of economy 
in short run. In this case, the historical economic evolution can be seen as permanent but 
fluctuating overlapping transfers of cohorts of economic factors (labour, capital) from official 
sector to underground sector and reverse. During the instability periods, as crises, wars or 
transitions there is an intensification of transfers in double sense between the two sectors of 
economy, that corresponds to certain great structural re-adjustments of the economic system 
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